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Queer/Religious Friendship in the Obama Era 
Jeffrey A. Redding  
[P]art of what I hope to offer as president is the ability to reach 
to people that I don‘t agree with, and the evangelical 
community is one where the Democratic Party, I think, we 
have generally seen as hostile. We haven‘t been reaching out 
to them, and I think that if we‘re going to makes [sic] 
significant progress on critical issues that we face, . . . we‘ve 
got to be able to get beyond our comfort zones and just talk to 
people we don‘t like. 
—Barack Obama1 
 
 
 Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Portions of this Article 
were presented at the American Society of Comparative Law‘s 2008 Annual Meeting, two 
symposia on California‘s Proposition 8 at Chapman University School of Law during the 2008–
09 academic year, a spring 2009 faculty workshop at Saint Louis University School of Law, and 
the Queer/Empire conference at McGill University‘s Faculty of Law during the spring of 2009. 
I thank participants at these fora for their questions and comments, and also Kim Brooks, Mary 
Anne Case, Glenn Cohen, Katherine Darmer, Adrienne Davis, Moon Duchin, Chad Flanders, 
Roger Goldman, Menaka Guruswamy, Holning Lau, Robert Leckey, Sebastian Lourido, Eric 
Miller, Chantal Nadeau, Doug Nejaime, Karen Petroski, Darren Rosenblum, Laura Rosenbury, 
Kerry Ryan, Pete Salsich, Kendall Thomas, Molly Walker Wilson, and Kenji Yoshino for very 
helpful individual comments and conversations. Dallin Merrill, Kate Mortensen, and Kevin 
Salzman provided excellent research assistance for this Article, and both Yale‘s Fund for 
Lesbian and Gay Studies (―FLAGS‖) and Saint Louis University‘s School of Law provided 
generous support for the research required by this Article. This Article is a continuation and 
extension of previous work of mine concerning same-sex marriage, and portions of the 
following works are thereby relied upon in this Article: (1) Jeffrey A. Redding, Dignity, Legal 
Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 791 (2010), and (2) Jeffrey A. 
Redding, Queer/Religious Potentials in U.S. Same-Sex Marriage Debates, in QUEER THEORY: 
LAW, CULTURE, EMPIRE 122 (Kimberley Brooks & Robert Leckey eds., 2010). Of course, all 
errors of fact and judgment across this entire critical marriage project remain mine alone. This 
Article is dedicated to Sebastian Lourido, for crossing so many borders with me. 
 1. Meet the Press: Barack Obama (MSNBC television broadcast Nov. 11, 2007), 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21738432/page/5/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
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A NEW BEGINNING 
November 4, 2008, was a confusing day for many American gays 
and lesbians. On the one hand, this election day witnessed the 
democratic repudiation of a homophobic Republican Party, and the 
reinvigoration of a homophilic Democratic Party. On the other hand, 
gays and lesbians were seemingly handed a stunning defeat in the 
ostensibly friendly ―blue‖ state of California in the form of 
Proposition 8.
2
 Even more perplexing and alarming for gays and 
lesbians was the fact that Proposition 8‘s success seemed, in the 
immediate aftermath of the election, to be the result of large numbers 
of African-Americans voting at the California polls for the 
Democrats, but against gays and lesbians.
3
 Gay and lesbian logic 
could make no sense of this result: the friend (African-Americans) of 
gays and lesbians‘ friend (the Democratic Party) should be gays and 
lesbians‘ friend, correct? The answer, or so it confusingly seemed, 
was ―not really.‖ 
In this Article, I aim to address the Proposition 8 debacle and its 
aftermath by challenging commonplace notions of queer political 
friendship in the Obama era. Differentiating between an assimilative 
gay and lesbian
4
 politics, and a more imaginative queer politics, I 
 
 2. Proposition 8 is also known as the California Marriage Protection Act, and it was 
approved by voter-ballot initiative and enacted into law by Californians on November 4, 2008. 
Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 
2008, at A1. Proposition 8 inserted the following provision into the State of California‘s 
constitution: ―Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.‖ 
Preserving California‟s Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at A20. For more 
information on Proposition 8, see Proposition 8: Voter Information Guide, http://www.voter 
guide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/generaltitle-sum/prop8-title-sum.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 3. Research conducted subsequent to the November 4, 2008, poll demonstrated that 
African-American votes were not the decisive factor in Proposition 8‘s success. See Justin 
Ewers, Poll: Black Voters Not Responsible for Passage of Same-Sex Marriage Ban in 
California, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/ 
national/2008/12/04/poll-black-voters-not-responsible-for-passage-of-same-sex-marriage-ban-
in-california.html (―If black voters had voted the same way as whites—50 percent for same-sex 
marriage and 50 percent opposed—the net gain for same-sex marriage supporters would have 
been slightly more than 500,000 votes. Prop 8 passed by a margin of just under 600,000 
votes.‖). 
 4. One might also refer to ―LGBT‖ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered) political 
advocacy here. I use the expression ―gay, lesbian, and bisexual‖ (or ―gay and lesbian‖ as an 
unfortunately useful shorthand) in this Article, instead of more-inclusive ―LGBT‖ terminology, 
since many of the issues concerning same-sex marriage—which is a major focus of mine in this 
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argue that queers have been hurt by mainstream gay and lesbian 
political advocacy—the kind of advocacy, for example, that both led 
up to and followed Proposition 8—and that, as a consequence, queers 
should actively contest and act to counter this gay and lesbian 
advocacy in political and legal arenas. In other words, I argue that, to 
the extent that there has been friendly cooperation with gay and 
lesbian politics by queers, queers should vigorously and skeptically 
reconsider this cooperation. Moreover, in addition to suggesting an 
unorthodox queer ―adversary‖ in this Article, I will simultaneously 
suggest an orthodox ―ally,‖ namely, the radically religious opponents 
of gay and lesbian same-sex marriage. 
My encouragement here of a queer rupture with gay and lesbian 
politics will surprise some people. For some, it will come as a 
revelation that there is not a vast left-wing conspiracy out there. 
However, many others before me have contested any supposed neat 
alignment within ―progressive‖ politics; the forced friendship 
between racial minorities and gays and lesbians in the United States 
is but one example subject in this literature.
5
 
 
Article—are only occasionally issues for transgendered people. Indeed, ―[s]ame-sex marriages 
already exist in the transgender community.‖ Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi 
Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time 
Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2001). Same-sex marriages arise in the transgendered 
community as a result of post-marital changes in the natal sex of one partner in an opposite-sex 
marital relationship. See generally Jennifer L. Levi, Advising Transgender Clients, in 
REPRESENTING NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES (2d ed. 2006). Same-sex marriages also arise in the 
transgendered community when states refuse to legally recognize post-natal sex changes. As a 
consequence, same-sex-appearing marriages result when one person in an opposite-sex 
relationship transitions between sexes yet is still allowed to marry a partner of the ―same‖ sex 
because the state refuses to legally recognize the sex change. Frye & Meiselman, supra, at 
1033. This ironic result of a state‘s refusal to recognize post-natal changes in the legal sex of 
individuals can be found in Tennessee, Texas, Kansas, Florida, and Ohio. See Julie A. 
Greenberg, When Is a Same-Sex Marriage Legal? Full Faith and Credit and Sex 
Determination, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 289, 296–98 (2005). Finally, and more theoretically, 
transgendered individuals may object to the entire methodology concerning the duality or even 
knowability of ―sex‖ that often arises in the context of ―gay and lesbian marriage‖ being 
advocated for, and read in, the register of ―same-sex‖ marriage. See Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-
Orientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN‘S L.J 219, 220 
(1998) (―Both the opponents and the proponents of same-sex marriage have generally assumed 
that ‗same-sex marriage‘ is equivalent to ‗gay or lesbian marriage.‘‖). 
 5. For example, Janet Jakobsen has written: 
Progressives argue that sexual orientation should be a protected category, like race, but 
it is hardly as if legal prohibition has effectively protected people of color from racism 
in U.S. society. . . . [As a result, t]hose who fought for civil rights protections can feel 
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Indeed, it is well known in both theoretical and activist circles that 
take up sexuality issues, that there are serious divergences in the 
imaginations and aims of each respective camp.
6
 As a result, it has 
been far more difficult than it commonly seems to speak of LGBTIQ
7
 
people in any easy fashion. In fact, whatever cohesive unity that 
exists here is perhaps only epiphenomenal to the common perception 
of an angry, irrational, religious enemy. This all being the case, my 
suggestion here of a divorce between queer politics and gay and 
lesbian politics can only update, in the light of continually 
troublesome post-November 2008 developments in gay and lesbian 
politics, powerful extant queer arguments about the many serious 
problems with contemporary gay and lesbian politics. Such 
arguments have been made previously by people like Judith Butler,
8
 
Janet Halley,
9
 and Michael Warner.
10
  
 
used when their struggles are invoked as the stable ground of analogy without 
recognition of either the difficulties of those struggles or the continuing fragility of 
civil rights protections when it comes to race. 
Janet R. Jakobsen, Queers Are Like Jews, Aren‟t They? Analogy and Alliance Politics, in 
QUEER THEORY AND THE JEWISH QUESTION 64, 70–71 (Daniel Boyarin et al. eds., 2003). 
 6. Broadly speaking, queer theoreticians and activists have advocated less assimilative 
views about sexuality and social order than those that gay and lesbian advocates have pushed.  
 7. ―LGBTIQ‖ is short for ―Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Queer.‖ 
 8. See generally Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 229 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 9. Janet Halley has discussed how 
gay and queer thought and aims diverge. Each seeks the welfare of a different kind of 
sexual subject. A gay-identity approach posits that some people are homosexual and 
that the stigma attached to this kind of person should be removed. By contrast, a queer 
approach regards the homosexual/heterosexual distinction with skepticism and even 
resentment, arguing that it is historically contingent and is itself oppressive. 
Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 8, at 80, 82. 
 10. Michael Warner, for example, has written quite eloquently of these problems in THE 
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL. Writing critically of the gay and lesbian movement, from a queer 
perspective, Warner comments:  
The gay and lesbian movement is America‘s longest-running sex scandal. It might 
have been expected to end all sexual scandal once and for all, to declare an end to the 
days of shame, bringing sex out of the closet and into the daylight, letting all the 
gerbils scamper free. Its leaders, especially, might have become, by this late date, 
unembarrassable. But that hasn‘t happened. Many of the leaders and organizations of 
the gay and lesbian movement continue to be defensive about sex and sexual variance. 
. . . [and] many of the movement‘s spokespersons . . . have increasingly called for a 
―new maturity,‖ beyond mere sex. 
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In comparison to its suggestion of a queer adversary, this Article‘s 
more significant contribution is its suggestion of a new queer friend: 
the so-called ―radical religious right.‖ At first blush, this suggestion 
that queers befriend the radical religious right seems ludicrous. 
Indeed, more so than ever, these seem to be troubled times for 
relations between American queers and religious Americans of 
almost every stripe. While the past couple of decades witnessed some 
successful efforts at prodding some relatively more ―progressive‖ 
American religions into a less fearful stance on human sexuality,
11
 it 
would seem to many people that progress hit a fairly serious 
roadblock with the passage of Proposition 8. Indeed, after this voter-
ballot initiative, gays, lesbians, and queers made much of the 
financial contributions of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints
12
 and Catholic Church to the pro-Proposition 8 campaign.
13
 In 
 
MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER 
LIFE 45 (1999). Elsewhere, and from his (and others‘) queer perspective, Warner has called 
mainstream gay and lesbian organizations promoting marriage ―fundamentally alien 
organizations.‖ Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, 
supra note 8, at 259, 263. 
 11. For example, American elements of the globalized Anglican church have been sites of 
movement with respect to the treatment of homosexuality in Christianity. In 2003, the 
(Anglican) Episcopal Diocese of New Hampshire ordained Gene Robinson as its bishop. 
Profile: Bishop Gene Robinson, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3208586.stm (last visited 
Sept. 1, 2010). Robinson, who at the time had lived openly with another man for almost twenty 
years, had previously divorced his wife after acknowledging his homosexuality to both himself 
and her. Id. His ordination as Anglican bishop marked the first time that a sexually active, 
openly homosexual man had been so ordained. Id.  
 This is not to suggest, however, that this event passed without controversy in the American 
branch of the Anglican church and elsewhere in the Anglican world. For example, in response 
to Robinson‘s ordination, many Anglican churches both within and without the United States 
loudly protested, claiming that Robinson‘s ordination was a perversion of Biblical teachings 
and law. See id. Moreover, in the aftermath of Robinson‘s ordination, some individual 
American Anglican (Episcopalian) churches and dioceses that disagreed with Robinson‘s 
ordination oriented themselves away from the American Episcopalian church, seeking 
association with like-minded Anglican bishops and provinces in Africa and South America. 
See, e.g., Fort Worth: More Diocesan Leaders Endorse Realignment, EPISCOPAL LIFE ONLINE, 
Sept. 11, 2008, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/81803_100590_ENG_HTM.htm; Mary 
Frances Schjonberg, Pittsburgh: Episcopal Church Petitions to Join Property Case, Wants 
Duncan to Vacate Offices, EPISCOPAL LIFE ONLINE, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.episcopal 
church.org/81803_105094_ENG_HTM.htm; US Anglicans Join Kenyan Church, BBC NEWS, 
Aug. 30, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6970093.stm.  
 12. This is the denominationally-preferred name for what is commonly known as the 
―Mormon Church.‖ See The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Style Guide—the 
Name of the Church, http://newsroom.lds.org/ldsnewsroom/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=ca07ae4af9c 
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response, efforts were initiated to repeal the tax-exempt status of 
religious groups and institutions which participate in political and 
legislative campaigns, thereby threatening the interests and financial 
viability of many more such groups and institutions (whether non-
progressive or progressive) than those which were the direct target of 
gay and lesbian ire.
14
 In doing so, gays, lesbians, and queers chose to 
ignore history‘s lesson that ―the proximate sources of heightened 
[conservative Christian] activism have frequently been perceptions 
that governmental policies benefiting fundamentalist and evangelical 
institutions, especially their financing, were in danger of ending.‖15  
Even more alarming, in reaction to the passage of Proposition 8, 
the streets of American cities witnessed loud scenes of gay, lesbian, 
and queer anger and protest, often directed at Mormons and their 
temples.
16
 And more quietly, gays, lesbians, and queers renewed their 
 
7e010VgnVCM1000004e94610aRCRD (last visited Sept 1, 2010). In line with official 
denomination preferences, I will be referring to members of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints as ―Mormons‖ in this Article. 
 13. Dan Aiello, Prop 8 Foes Slow to Pick up on Mormon Involvement, BAY AREA REP., 
Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://ebar.com/news/article.php?sec=news&article=3713; John 
Wildermuth, Mormon Church Reports $190,000 Prop. 8 Expenses, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 31, 2009, 
at B3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/30/BA7615KLB9. 
DTL; Posting of Jessica Garrison to L.A. Now, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/01/ 
top-officials-w.html (Jan. 30, 2009, 17:51 PST); Posting of Andy Towle to Towleroad, 
http://www.towleroad.com/2009/10/documentary-exposes-mormon-financial-contributions-to-
prop-8.html (Oct. 20, 2009, 12:24 EST). 
 14. See Editorial: Mormon Church Should Lose Tax Exempt Status Over Prop 8 Support, 
UWIRE, Nov. 14, 2008, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/18/politics/ 
uwire/main4613144.shtml; Mormons Stole Our Rights, http://www.mormonsstoleourrights.com 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010); Posting of Mario Ruiz to the Huffington Post, http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/mario-ruiz/gays-hit-back-at-mormons_b_142001.html (Nov. 6, 2008, 23:20 
EST); Posting of Patricia Nell Warren to The Bilerico Project, http://www.bilerico. 
com/2008/11/why_stop_at_punishing_just_the_mormon_ch.php (Nov. 9, 2008, 10:00 EST). 
For a queer perspective skeptical of this gay and lesbian tactic, see Posting of Sam Ritchie to 
The Bilerico Project, http://www.bilerico.com/2009/11/attacking_tax-exemptions_for_churches 
_a_lose-lose.php (Nov. 12, 2009, 09:30 EST). 
 15. Rogers M. Smith, Secularism, Constitutionalism, and the Rise of Christian 
Conservatism in the United States, Address of Religion in the 21st Century, University of 
Copenhagen (May 30, 2007) (on file with author) (emphasis added). 
 16. See, e.g., Gay-Marriage Rally Held at NYC Mormon Temple, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Nov. 12, 2008, available at http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/gay-marriage-rally-held-
at-nyc-mormon-temple-1.885717?9r=1; Posting of Chris Rovzar to NY Magazine: Daily Intel, 
http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2008/11/gays_turn_anger_snappy_sarcasm.html (Nov. 13, 2008, 
10:00 EST); Posting of Andy Towle to Towleroad, http://www.towleroad.com/2008/11/prop-8-
protes-1.html (Nov. 9, 2008, 00:47 EST). A constant refrain at these protests was the willful 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol33/iss1/8
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fire on a traditional nemesis, the Catholic Church, and newly 
discovered ones as well, namely African-American churches.
17
 
This all being the case, in this Article I argue that these anti-
religious actions and the animosity fueling them have been counter-
productive from an American queer perspective. More specifically, I 
argue that American queers went down the wrong road by joining 
with mainstream gay and lesbian advocates protesting religious 
groups, instead of joining with religious groups in protest of 
mainstream gay and lesbian advocacy. Certainly, the campaign 
surrounding Proposition 8 was deeply troublesome in any number of 
aspects, and people should always have the freedom to criticize their 
adversaries. However, that being the case, I believe that queers 
misfired in their religion-directed protests after the passage of 
Proposition 8, and that if any list of queer-dubious groups or agendas 
is going to be drawn up, that list should include all those involved in 
attempting to institute a hegemonic politics of family. As I will detail 
below, this would include contemporary mainstream gay and lesbian 
advocacy with its (legally) monistic marriage agenda.  
Moreover, beyond suggesting an unorthodox
18
 queer adversary in 
this Article, I aim to simultaneously suggest an orthodox ally, 
namely, the radically religious opponents of contemporary gay and 
lesbian same-sex marriage advocates. Real opportunities to forge new 
 
distortion and mocking disrespect of religious (and, most notably, Mormon) beliefs and 
practices. For example, some signs at these protests contained the following slogans and 
statements: ―You want three wives, I want one husband;‖ ―I Don‘t Need 5 Wives, Just 1 
Husband;‖ and ―Keep Your Magic Undies Off My Civil Rights.‖ See, e.g., Keep Your Magic 
Undies Off My Civil Rights, NBC L.A., http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Prop_8_ 
Protestors_March_LA_Streets.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). For a statement from Mormon 
leadership firmly disavowing polygamy, see The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
Polygamy: Latter-day Saints and the Practice of Plural Marriage, http://www.newsroom.lds. 
org/ldsnewsroom/eng/background-information/polygamy-latter-day-saints-and-the-practice-of-
plural-marriage (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 17. For commentary relating to same-sex marriage supporters‘ blaming of African-
American churches for the Proposition 8 vote outcome, see, e.g., Teresa Morrison, Debunking 
the Black Blame, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.advocate.com/exclusive_detail_ 
ektid65518.asp and Posting by Byron Williams to The Huffington Post, http://www.huffington 
post.com/byron-williams/blaming-the-african-ameri_b_143892.html (Nov. 14, 2008, 11:15 
EST). 
 18. See supra notes 8–10 for examples of authors who have previously made arguments 
about the differences between queer politics and gay and lesbian politics that correspond to the 
arguments I articulate in this Article. 
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kinds of political friendship between queers and religious people, as 
well as real possibilities of generating imaginative legal frameworks 
that are enhancing of queer agency,
19
 have been lost by queer 
cooperation with a gay and lesbian-led retreat into a strictly secular, 
religion-phobic sexuality politics.
20
 Queers never had to and should 
not continue to join in this retreat. What is needed instead is a more, à 
la Judith Butler, ―antifoundationalist approach to coalition politics.‖21  
That being the case, in this Article, I will argue not only that 
mainstream gay and lesbian same-sex marriage advocates‘ 
jurispathic
22
 efforts in support of legal uniformity have been averse to 
queer interests, but also that Proposition 8 and other legally 
pluralistic, non-secular family law agendas hold great promise for 
queer interests. Indeed, while supporters of Proposition 8 have said 
many homophobic things, and while Proposition 8 itself was 
jurispathic in some respects, it was also jurisgenerative in its reviving 
of space for queers to engage in new legal thinking, activism, and 
legislation around queer norms concerning relationship-recognition 
and family law. Crucially, Proposition 8 returned California to a 
vibrant reality of radical non-legal uniformity, or legal pluralism, 
where same-sex couples are governed by a ―domestic partnership‖ 
regime and mixed-sex couples are governed by the regime of 
―marriage.‖ In Proposition 8‘s resuscitation of the California same-
sex domestic partnership regime, this controversial ballot initiative 
not only gave new life to a legal arena potentially imbued with queer 
agency, but also opened up unprecedented opportunity for, and 
protection of, additional non-majoritarian relationship-recognition 
 
 19. For a more detailed discussion of how I understand the idea of ―agency,‖ see Jeffrey 
A. Redding, Dignity, Legal Pluralism, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 791, 835–
37 (2010). 
 20. I realize that this claim about the secular nature of contemporary gay and lesbian 
politics is a controversial one, but I believe it is more than defensible. Indeed, it is supported by 
a recent report by the influential United States-based National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. 
REBECCA VOELKEL, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, A TIME TO BUILD UP: 
ANALYSIS OF THE NO ON PROPOSITION 8 CAMPAIGN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PRO-
LGBTQQIA RELIGIOUS ORGANIZING 1 (2009), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/ 
reports/reports/time_to_build_up_rev.pdf.  
 21. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 21 
(4th ed. 2008). 
 22. I use this term in the Coverian sense. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40–44 (1983). 
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regimes in the future. At least some of these potential legislative 
regimes have the distinct possibility of being more directly 
responsive to queer lives, queer relations, and queer families than 
majoritarian marriage ever will be. In other words, and as I have 
argued elsewhere at great length, one can see Proposition 8 as having 
created not a ―separate but equal‖ legal situation, but the real 
possibility of ―separate and better‖23 legal arrangements for queers. 
Ultimately then, I believe one can see Proposition 8—and its 
religious supporters—as having opened up new and meaningful 
vistas in queer agency and, as a consequence, queer dignity.
24
 In 
contrast to this kind of dignity-enhancing legal pluralism, same-sex 
marriage advocates have largely been advocating for a queer-dignity-
detracting legal uniformity, i.e., one-size-fits-all ―marriage.‖25  
While undesirably hegemonic in itself, gay and lesbian same-sex 
marriage advocates‘ jurispathic goal has also raised the ire of many, 
though certainly not all,
26
 religious people. The tactics deployed by 
same-sex marriage supporters after the Proposition 8 vote only served 
to add fuel to the existing fire between gay and lesbian activists and 
their religious adversaries.
27
  
As a result, at this point in time, it seems clear that most 
contemporary gay and lesbian same-sex marriage advocates have 
largely turned their backs on the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, the Catholic Church, and other religious groupings that have 
not been allegedly progressive enough to re-interpret and reform their 
religious texts, practices, and silences to allow for same-sex marriage. 
In response, my goal in this Article is to suggest that American queer 
activism needs to realign itself at this moment in time, deepening its 
traditional skepticism of mainstream gay and lesbian politics, while 
initiating an embrace of the radically religious people that this gay 
 
 23. I explore the idea of a ―separate and better‖ queer family law regime in greater detail 
in Redding, supra note 19. 
 24. For a more-detailed exploration of the relationship between queer agency and queery 
dignity, see generally id. 
 25. I borrow the expression ―one-size-fits-all‖ from Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, 
The One-Size-Fits-All Family, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 137 (2009).  
 26. See, for example, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009), for the Iowa 
Supreme Court‘s observations in this respect, as well as the numerous amicus briefs filed by 
religious organizations in favor of same-sex marriage in that case. 
 27. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
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and lesbian politics has scorned. Indeed, however tempting and self-
satisfying and occasionally witty it might be to adopt the flippant 
stance towards Mormons and other religious folk that many gay and 
lesbian same-sex marriage advocates have adopted, I believe that 
American queer thought and activism can and should adopt a 
substantially different approach.  
In Part I, I offer some important clarifications, definitions, and 
disclaimers with respect to the arguments that I make in this Article, 
including how I am understanding and using the terms ―queer,‖ 
―radically religious,‖ and ―friendship.‖  
In Part II, I discuss how contemporary gay and lesbian same-sex 
marriage advocacy has effectively de-friended queers by wielding a 
peculiar conception of ―dignity‖ in a jurispathic and queer-phobic 
manner. As I demonstrate in this Part, this gay and lesbian 
advocacy‘s attempt to institute majoritarian marriage for everyone 
has hobbled a potential for robust queer agency by undermining the 
separate legal infrastructure necessary for the maintenance of 
meaningful same-sex domestic partnership and civil union regimes 
(or, what I will refer to in this Article occasionally as ―queer space‖). 
My discussion in Part II sets the stage for my exploration in Part 
III of how, in contrast to mainstream American gay and lesbian 
advocates, a number of religious folk have acted in a more queer-
friendly manner by arguing for different understandings and 
implementations of human dignity (and its conceptual cognates, e.g., 
minority rights, toleration, etc.), namely ones that are jurisgenerative 
and pluralistically oriented. As I demonstrate in this Part, in contexts 
as varied as Canada, the United Kingdom, and India, many religious 
people have used dignity arguments to demand the possibility of 
pluralistic family law alternatives that can remain somewhat 
separate—and protected—from majoritarian law and majoritarian 
demands. In other words, ―dignity‖ in these contexts has been used 
by religious people to argue for the possibility of separate—and, from 
the perspective of many, better—family law for non-majoritarian 
peoples.  
In Part IV, I use Part III‘s illustrative discussion to argue that now 
might very well be the time for queer and religious people in the 
contemporary United States to work together on advocating for and 
building a kind of legal regime that is more encouraging of legislative 
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spaces protective of both queer and (radically) religious interests. In 
this respect, I discuss two specific aspects of a larger agenda on 
which newly-friendly queers and radically religious folk might 
collaborate in the United States. These aspects concern (1) the further 
development of alternatives to majoritarian marriage and family law, 
and (2) active resistance to the legal strategies and understandings 
deployed by attorneys Theodore Olson and David Boies in their 
ongoing Perry v. Schwarzenegger litigation challenging the U.S. 
constitutional bona fides of California‘s Proposition 8. With respect 
to the second aspect, I also suggest and develop in this Part an 
alternative queer/religious legal strategy, using arguments which are 
embedded in the City of San Francisco‘s motion to intervene in Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger. 
I. CLARIFICATIONS AND DISCLAIMERS 
Before moving to a fuller development of this Article‘s 
arguments, some clarifications, definitions, and disclaimers are 
necessary. Perhaps most urgent is the issue of how I am 
understanding and using the terms ―queer‖ and ―radically religious,‖ 
or, in other words: Which individuals and groups precisely do I 
believe constitute each of these categories? 
While I can understand and anticipate the need from some readers 
for such specificity as to category membership, I believe it is 
important, from the outset, to avoid answering such a query with the 
extreme amount of precision implicitly demanded by such a question. 
This cautious response is warranted for a few different reasons.  
Most importantly, by encouraging ―queer‖ and ―radically 
religious‖ folk to be in direct conversation—and collaboration—with 
each other, I expect that each movement‘s understanding and practice 
of itself will undergo changes, as will each‘s composition. Thus, 
while it is possible to name important queer theorists and activists 
here
28—for example, Judith Butler, Janet Halley, and Michael 
Warner—as well as important personalities and organizations in the 
radically religious camp
29—for example, Jay Sekulow at the 
 
 28. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 29. See generally STEVEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, 
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American Center for Law and Justice, and Matthew Staver at the 
Liberty Counsel—there is no guarantee that all of these actors will 
remain ―in the fold‖ as some of the unsettling implications of a 
queer/religious friendship become clearer. As it is, each movement is 
already in an unstable and dynamic dialectic with its ―other,‖30 and 
any effort here to freeze such a sociocultural process, and attempt to 
fix who precisely is ―queer‖ and who precisely is ―radically 
religious,‖ would be a fairly useless enterprise. Moreover, it would be 
a move with little or no predictive power. Following Judith Butler, I 
believe that ―the value of coalitional politics is not to be 
underestimated, but the very form of coalition, of an emerging and 
unpredictable assemblage of positions, cannot be figured in 
advance.‖31 
In addition, in this Article I am less interested in identifying 
specific groups and personalities as either/or than I am interested in 
tapping into a certain register of politics. In fact, one might say that I 
am less interested here in a register of politics, and more interested in 
a religious and sexual ―anti-politics.‖ Accordingly, when I 
ascriptively use the adjectival expression ―radically religious‖ in this 
Article, I mean to conjure those self-consciously religious individuals 
and groups who represent unruly challenges to the modern 
bureaucratic American state, and who refuse to be either tamed or 
normalized into meekly obeying the regulative imperatives and 
commands of this state. As queer theorist Michael Warner might 
describe these religious individuals and groups, they are those which 
do not indulge in a ―state fetish.‖32 While I do not intend to suggest 
any strict and unchanging character or boundaries of ―the state‖ or 
―the law‖ or their antagonists,33 another way of articulating my 
 
THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS (2002); HANS J. HACKER, THE CULTURE OF 
CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LITIGATION (2005). 
 30. See TINA FETNER, HOW THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT SHAPED LESBIAN AND GAY ACTIVISM 
119–29 (2008). While Fetner is more concerned with explicitly gay and lesbian activism in her 
book, rather than LGBT (or queer) activism, see id. at xviii, her larger focus on the ―interactive 
effect between opposing movements: the effect that each movement has on the other, and the 
impact of that interaction on [each] social movement[‘s] goals‖ is helpful. See id. at 121. 
 31. BUTLER, supra note 21, at 20. 
 32. See Warner, supra note 10, at 284. 
 33. Indeed, one must wonder along with Sally Engle Merry as to ―[w]here do we stop 
speaking of law and find ourselves simply describing social life?‖ Sally Engle Merry, Legal 
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friendship project here is to say that I am interested in how those 
individuals and groups who seek legal exceptionalism, rather than 
inclusion in the orderly operation of the modern state and its 
imperatives, might become better friends.
34
 More affirmatively, and 
to borrow from the title of Marc Galanter‘s well-known work, one 
could also say that I am interested in those individuals and groups, 
both religious and queer, who recognize that ―justice [can be found] 
in many rooms.‖35 
That being said, no group, individual, or movement in itself 
embodies an entirely rejectionist politics. For example, some of the 
radically religious groups that have sought legal exceptionalism have 
argued for that exceptionalism using, of all things, the U.S. 
Constitution‘s First Amendment.36 Indeed, this reality provides only 
more reason to resist the call to strictly define exactly who and what I 
mean by ―radically religious‖ or ―queer.‖ Normal and un-normal 
political sentiments filter through all of us. And this is all the reason 
more to wonder why queer and religious folk are not in more-regular 
and more-direct conversation and collaboration with each other.  
Given all of this, it is admittedly the case that some of the terms 
that I use in this Article—namely ―adversary,‖ ―enemy,‖ ―friend,‖ 
―ally,‖ and the like—are hyperbolic ones. This is especially the case 
seeing that it is nearly impossible to find any entity that, in its 
entirety, and on all issues, can be simplistically characterized as 
either/or. That being said, I will use these terms in this Article, 
provocative and occasionally theoretically misplaced as they may be, 
because I believe that only strong language can work to dislodge the 
present array of agendas and alliances from its awkward and 
unproductive stasis of queer/religious disconnects.  
Indeed, while I will focus in this Article on how queers and the 
radically religious might collaborate on family law pluralism projects 
specifically, there are a variety of other projects in which both 
 
Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 869, 878 (1988). 
 34. In American legalese, the terms would be ―accommodation‖ versus ―inclusion.‖ See 
generally Douglas NeJaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for 
Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303 (2009). 
 35. See generally Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and 
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981). 
 36. See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 34, at 375. 
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movements might very well recognize the other‘s agenda. Such 
collaborative projects, for example, could include a joint offensive 
against gay and lesbian attempts to institute in the educational realm 
what Douglas NeJaime characterizes as a ―gay centrist position of 
sexual orientation as a stable, seemingly innate, identity category.‖37 
Such a gay and lesbian education agenda sexually neuters its human 
subjects, which is in sharp tension with queer ontology.
38
 Similarly, 
like many queer thinkers and activists, many members of the 
Christian Right assert the ineluctably sexual aspects of being non-
heterosexual.
39
 While this can (and cannot) be an essentialist position, 
these relatively radical Christians also hold out the possibility that 
people may convert from one sexuality to another. Most gay and 
lesbian groups find the possibility of ―conversion‖ existentially 
threatening, if not altogether a false proposition.
40
 However, a queer 
ethic may find much truth and fascination in this radical challenge to 
mainstream gay and lesbian claims about the genetic sources and 
abiding stability of sexual identity. Last, but not least, to the extent 
that radical Muslims are part of the American radical religious 
tableau, they and queers might form a friendship centered around 
developing a critical politics of the body and its defilement through 
Islamophobic American torture. 
Thus, while I focus in this Article on family law as an arena where 
queers and the radically religious can cooperate, there are potentially 
other areas of cooperation as well. However, in opening up space for 
new connections, alliances, and friendships in the Obama era, I do 
not intend in this Article to suggest that queer interests and those of 
the radically religious are homologous, any more than I mean to 
 
 37. Id. at 373. 
 38. See id. at 369–71. 
 39. See id. at 372–73. 
 40. See id. at 334–35 for a discussion of a battle between Christian and gay and lesbian 
groups over the inclusion of material on ―ex-gays,‖ along with information on gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals, in a Maryland public school system‘s sexual education programming. The well-
known organization Parents, Family, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (―PFLAG‖) has also 
characterized gay-straight conversion as involving ―the discredited notion that homosexuality is 
a choice which can be corrected through so called reparative therapy.‖ Parents, Family, and 
Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Advocacy & Issues: Anti-Equality Organizations, http:// 
community.pflag.org/Page.aspx?pid=504 (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
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concur with extant conclusions that queer, gay, and lesbian interests 
can (or should) all coexist in an easy peace.
41
 
In this respect, it is also important to acknowledge here that 
American queer practice could more firmly distance itself from 
contemporary gay and lesbian politics without embracing the 
radically religious. As the maxim goes, the enemy of one‘s enemy is 
not necessarily one‘s friend. I acknowledge that. However, in what 
follows, after first demonstrating the kind of ill-advised and 
(arguably) queer-phobic arguments for family law uniformity that 
contemporary mainstream gay and lesbian same-sex marriage 
advocates are putting forward presently, I will proceed to discuss 
how, in contrast to this gay and lesbian advocacy, religious 
movements and groups have taken the lead in proposing queer-philic 
alternatives to majoritarian marriage, both in the United States and 
elsewhere. This is not to say that religious people fall into line on the 
question of family law pluralism—they do not—but it is to say that 
where one finds legal alternatives to majoritarian marriage, it is 
religious people who have most often successfully argued for and 
achieved these alternatives. This suggests that American queer 
practice not only can learn from religious political practice but also 
that, to the extent that religious people are at the forefront of efforts 
to moderate norm-domineering states, queer politics can find a ready 
friend in the religious in efforts to escape majoritarian family law 
regimes. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize from the outset that the new 
alliance that I am proposing in this Article is not just a matter of 
crude tactical maneuvering; hence, my repeated use of the emotive 
and affective word ―friendship.‖ Rather, as I will demonstrate below, 
my suggestion here results from a deeply principled rethinking of 
who is friendly, and who is unfriendly, to queer interests.
42
 While 
 
 41. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Elusive Coalitions: Reconsidering the Politics of Gender 
and Sexuality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (2010) (arguing that transgender advocates have 
demonstrated an admirable ―ability to combine short-term and long-term strategies, and to 
retain flexibility about means and ends‖ that unfortunately has been absent ―in the struggles 
between some feminists and queer theorists‖). 
 42. For more discussion on how principle can provide the foundation for belief in legal 
pluralism, see Martha Minow, Is Pluralism an Ideal or a Compromise?: An Essay for Carol 
Weisbrod, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1287 (2008). 
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majoritarian marriage has become one of the central aims and 
projects of contemporary gay and lesbian politics, this gay and 
lesbian agenda is adverse to queer people in important if under-
remarked ways. Queer friendship with this hostile gay and lesbian 
politics must, as a result, be reevaluated and reoriented.  
II. QUEER-PHOBIC GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCACY CONCERNING 
DIGNITY AND MAJORITARIAN MARRIAGE 
My quest for new queer friendships in the Obama era begins with 
an explanation and exploration of how mainstream gay and lesbian 
same-sex marriage advocates are using simplistic arguments 
concerning ―dignity‖ in a way potentially adverse to queer people and 
their welfare. Dignity is crucial to discuss given that both the 
California and Connecticut supreme courts, in line with mainstream 
gay and lesbian advocacy strategies, have recently and repeatedly 
invoked this concept when characterizing what is at stake for gays, 
lesbians, and queers with respect to ―marriage‖ as opposed to 
―domestic partnerships‖ or ―civil unions.‖ In this Part, I explicate and 
excavate these high courts‘ jurispathic and queer-phobic 
understanding and use of the concept of dignity.  
I concentrate in this Part on these two state high court judgments 
because they are the most recent state supreme court judgments that 
explicitly invoke the concept of dignity in their resolution of the 
question presented. By way of comparison, the recent Iowa Supreme 
Court judgment legalizing same-sex marriage in that state did not use 
the word ―dignity‖ even once in its judgment.43 Prior to the California 
and Connecticut high court decisions, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts issued an advisory opinion in 2004 to the 
Massachusetts Senate regarding a question similar to that addressed 
by the California and Connecticut courts, namely the constitutionality 
of a state government naming officially-recognized, otherwise-
equivalent same-sex relationships something other than ―marriage.‖44 
 
 43. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 44. See In re Opinions of Justices to Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). Earlier, of 
course, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had issued its groundbreaking opinion, 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), legalizing same-sex 
marriage. The concept of dignity played a role in this opinion as well, with the court declaring 
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However, I do not discuss this opinion in detail in this Part because 
so much of the analysis in that opinion is relied upon and utilized by 
the California and Connecticut supreme courts. In the dual interests 
of brevity and currency, I focus on these two most-recent state 
supreme court opinions instead. 
In the spring of 2008, the California Supreme Court handed down 
its groundbreaking decision concerning same-sex marriage in In re 
Marriage Cases.
45
 In this case, the court was asked to decide whether 
California‘s relationship-recognition system was consistent with the 
California Constitution‘s protections with respect to the right to 
marry and the right to equality.
46
 Under this relationship-recognition 
system, ―marriage‖ was reserved for mixed-sex couples, while same-
sex couples had access only to a parallel ―domestic partnership‖ 
regime. Like California, some other states had also created parallel 
systems of family law within their borders,
47
 but California‘s regime 
of separate laws for different sexual orientations was unusual in that 
it accorded domestic partners ―virtually all of the same legal benefits 
and privileges, and impose[d] . . . all of the same legal obligations 
and duties, that California law affords to and imposes upon a married 
couple.‖48 Accordingly, what the California Supreme Court had to 
decide in this case was whether California‘s ―separate but equal‖ 
family law system was constitutional under the California 
 
that ―[t]he Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It 
forbids the creation of second-class citizens.‖ Id. at 948. 
 45. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 46. See id. at 400. 
 47. For example, Hawaii has enacted a law concerning ―reciprocal beneficiaries‖ and 
Wisconsin has adopted a form of ―limited domestic partnership,‖ but neither scheme provides 
the same rights and obligations as ―marriage,‖ or California‘s expansive marriage-like 
―domestic partnership‖ regime. See Status of Same-Sex Relationships Nationwide, Lambda 
Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/nationwide-status-same-sex-relationships 
.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010) 
 48. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 398 (emphasis added). According to the court, nine 
differences remain between domestic partnerships and marriages in California. Id. at 416 n.24. 
Some of these differences are arguably to the benefit of people entering a domestic partnership, 
while others arguably impose burdens that people entering marriage do not face. Id. An 
example of an advantage is that domestic partnerships are easier to dissolve than marriages in 
California. Id. An example of a burden placed solely on people wishing to enter domestic 
partnerships is the requirement that such people have a common residence; there is no such 
common-residence requirement for people marrying. Id. 
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Constitution.
49
 Ultimately, the court held that this system was 
unconstitutional, and that same-sex couples had to be given 
―marriage‖ licenses just like mixed-sex couples.50 
I concentrate here on an aspect of the court‘s decision that has 
remained under-examined, namely, the court‘s discussion of the 
concept of dignity and its relationship to pluralistic family law 
systems. The court‘s words on the subject of how dignity relates to 
family law pluralism are worth quoting at length:  
One of the core elements of the right to establish an officially 
recognized family that is embodied in the California 
constitutional right to marry is a couple's right to have their 
family relationship accorded dignity and respect equal to that 
accorded other officially recognized families, and assigning a 
different designation for the family relationship of same-sex 
couples while reserving the historic designation of ‗marriage‘ 
exclusively for opposite-sex couples poses at least a serious 
risk of denying the family relationship of same-sex couples 
such equal dignity and respect. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [R]etaining the designation of marriage exclusively for 
opposite-sex couples and providing only a separate and distinct 
designation for same-sex couples may well have the effect of 
perpetuating a more general premise—now emphatically 
rejected by this state—that gay individuals and same-sex 
couples are in some respects ‗second-class citizens‘ who may, 
under the law, be treated differently from, and less favorably 
than, heterosexual individuals or opposite-sex couples.
51
 
Like other parts of the court‘s opinion, the court‘s discussion of 
dignity here was groundbreaking, but in an unanticipated and 
 
 49. Id. at 779. The court explicitly linked California‘s system of maintaining a ―separate 
institution of domestic partnership,‖ id. at 445 (emphasis added), with the historic practice of 
―relegat[ing] racial minorities to separate and assertedly equivalent public facilities and 
institutions,‖ id. at 451 (emphasis added). 
 50. The court held that California‘s system was unconstitutional on both a ―fundamental 
right to marry‖ and equal protection grounds. See id. at 419, 428, 452–53. 
 51. Id. at 400–02. 
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unfortunate way. For many people outside of the United States 
especially, the court‘s equation of dignity and family law uniformity 
is revolutionary, but mainly because it seems so ahistorical and 
ungrounded in real-world experience. In the next Part, I discuss these 
global family law experiences in more detail, and what they can tell 
us about how family law pluralism can actually enhance both the 
agency and dignity of non-majoritarian peoples. That being said, the 
reality of family law globally did not completely escape the court‘s 
attention in its opinion. For example, the court ably made use of a 
Canadian Supreme Court opinion in describing how the history of 
discrimination against gay people cautions against thinking that any 
separate and parallel family law system can be anything but 
discriminatory.
52
 Yet, as I discuss in the next Part, the court‘s global 
vision in its decision was extremely partial, avoiding not only a 
deeper exploration of Canadian family law realities and debates, but 
similar ones pertaining to family law pluralism, dignity, and the 
rights of non-majoritarian peoples elsewhere. 
Less than six months after the California Supreme Court‘s 
decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court followed with its own 
ground-breaking opinion on same-sex marriage. In Kerrigan v. 
Commissioner of Public Health,
53
 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
decided whether Connecticut‘s practice of ―segregat[ing] 
heterosexual and homosexual couples into [the] separate institutions‖ 
of ―marriage‖ and ―civil union,‖ respectively, violated the 
 
 52. Noted the court:  
[P]articularly in light of the historic disparagement of and discrimination against gay 
persons, there is a very significant risk that retaining a distinction in nomenclature with 
regard to this most fundamental of relationships whereby the term ―marriage‖ is 
denied only to same-sex couples inevitably will cause the new parallel institution that 
has been made available to those couples to be viewed as of a lesser stature than 
marriage and, in effect, as a mark of second-class citizenship. As the Canada Supreme 
Court observed in an analogous context: ―One factor which may demonstrate that 
legislation that treats the claimant differently has the effect of demeaning the 
claimant‘s dignity is the existence of pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, 
prejudice, or vulnerability experienced by the individual or group at issue. . .‖ It is 
logical to conclude that, in most cases, further differential treatment will contribute to 
the perpetuation or promotion of their unfair social characterization, and will have a 
more severe impact upon them, since they are already vulnerable. 
Id. at 445 (quoting M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, 54–55 (Can.)). 
 53. Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
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Connecticut Constitution‘s protections as to substantive due process 
and equality.
54
 Similar to California‘s system of parallel relationship-
recognition, Connecticut‘s civil union scheme ―conferred on [civil] 
unions all the rights and privileges that are granted to spouses in a 
marriage.‖55  
As the California Supreme Court did with California‘s ―separate 
but equal‖ legal set-up, the Connecticut Supreme Court too ultimately 
held that the denial of ―real‖56 marriage to same-sex couples in 
Connecticut implicated the dignity interests of these couples, and also 
homosexual—including, presumably, queer—individuals more 
generally.
57
 In this respect, the Connecticut court found that the 
formal equality that Connecticut had legislated between marriage and 
civil unions was suspect because these institutions did not operate in 
a historical vacuum.
58
 According to the court, ―[a]lthough marriage 
and civil unions do embody the same legal rights under our law, they 
are by no means ‗equal.‘ . . . [T]he former is an institution of 
transcendent historical, cultural and social significance, whereas the 
latter most surely is not.‖59  
With respect to this asserted significance for marriage, and 
echoing plaintiffs‘ claim that marriage—more so than civil unions—
is ―special,‖ the Connecticut Supreme Court‘s opinion explained in 
detail the unique and vital role that it feels marriage plays in the 
American polity.
60
 Following a number of other courts‘ leads, the 
 
 54. Id. at 411–12. The Connecticut Supreme Court understood the Connecticut 
Constitution‘s due process guarantee to incorporate ―the fundamental right to marry the person 
of [one‘s] choice.‖ Id. at 413. 
 55. Id. at 413. 
 56. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 417. 
 57. See id. at 417, 466–74. It should be noted that the Connecticut Supreme Court was 
also worried about how withholding ―marriage‖ from same-sex couples affects the well-being 
of such couples‘ children. According to the court:  
[T]he ban on same sex marriage is likely to have an especially deleterious effect on the 
children of same sex couples. A primary reason why many same sex couples wish to 
marry is so that their children can feel secure in knowing that their parents‘ 
relationships are as valid and as valued as the marital relationships of their friends‘ 
parents. 
Id. at 474. For more detail regarding harm to children, see also id. at 475 n.77. 
 58. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 418. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 416 (―[Plaintiffs] contend that [marriage] is an institution of unique and 
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Connecticut Court alternatively characterized marriage as 
―fundamental to our very existence and survival,‖61 ―intimate to the 
degree of being sacred,‖62 and, citing a more ancient yet less 
hyperbolic precedent, ―one of the most fundamental of human 
relationships.‖63  
As a result of this remarkably (and perhaps uniquely) esteemed 
institutional history for marriage, the withholding of ―marriage‖ 
nomenclature to same-sex couplings became acutely problematic for 
the court, especially given the fact that ―historically [same-sex 
couples have] been the object of scorn, intolerance, ridicule or 
worse.‖64 Indeed, as a consequence of this historical stigmatization, 
the court believed that civil unions could only be popularly perceived 
as ―an official state policy that [civil unions are] inferior to marriage, 
and that the committed relationships of same sex couples are of a 
lesser stature than comparable relationships of opposite sex 
couples.‖65 
Given these concerns, it was no surprise that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court ultimately determined that Connecticut‘s relationship 
recognition scheme violated the Connecticut Constitution‘s equality 
protections.
66
 In doing so, the court stressed the ―overriding 
similarities‖ between opposite-sex and same-sex couples,67 with 
same-sex couples ―shar[ing] the same interest in a committed and 
loving relationship as heterosexual persons who wish to marry, and [] 
shar[ing] the same interest in having a family and raising their 
children in a loving and supportive environment.‖68 Given the 
asserted fundamental equivalence between same-sex and mixed-sex 
couples, it became nearly inescapable that the court would declare 
that ―firmly established equal protection principles lead[] inevitably 
to the conclusion that gay persons are entitled to marry the otherwise 
 
enduring importance in our society, one that carries with it a special status.‖). 
 61. Id. (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 62. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). 
 63. Id. (quoting Davis v. Davis, 175 A. 574, 577 (1934)). 
 64. Id. at 418. 
 65. Id. at 475. 
 66. Id. at 481. 
 67. Id. at 424. 
 68. Id. 
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qualified same sex partner of their choice. . . . [S]ame sex couples 
cannot be denied the freedom to marry.‖69 Moreover, following this 
decision, Connecticut same-sex couples soon learned that they were 
not only entitled to marriage, but that they would have no choice but 
to be married if they wished to have their relationships officially 
recognized by the State of Connecticut. Shockingly, legislation 
passed by the state legislature after Kerrigan v. Commissioner of 
Public Health not only eradicated the civil union option for future 
couples, but also forcibly converted all previous civil unions into 
marriages.
70
 
The Connecticut Supreme Court‘s opinion thus reached the same 
basic conclusion as that of the California Supreme Court. One 
remarkable difference between the two decisions, however, was that 
the Connecticut Supreme Court opinion never discussed foreign legal 
or political experiences. As discussed above, the California Supreme 
Court opinion did discuss and utilize such experience but in an 
ungrounded and distorted manner. 
In the next Part, I present a different view of what transnational 
legal experience teaches with respect to how dignity and family law 
pluralism relate. As my discussion of non-majoritarian, religious 
politics there will suggest, gay and lesbian arguments that rely on 
non-pluralistic legal models and arguments are outdated, 
shortsighted, and as detrimental for non-majoritarian peoples—
including queers—as all arguments for legal monism tend to be. Most 
fundamentally, then, in the next Part, I aim to strip away the veneer 
of liberal obviousness that attaches to claims concerning dignity and 
its incompatibility with family law pluralism, including separate (and 
 
 69. Id. at 482. 
 70. In both Connecticut and New Hampshire, after the legalization of same-sex marriages 
in those two states, civil unions were automatically converted into ―marriages.‖ See GAY & 
LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT CONNECTICUT‘S 
TRANSITION FROM CIVIL UNIONS TO MARRIAGE 4 (2009), http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/ 
publications/ct-cu-to-marriage.pdf; Andrew J. Manuse, New Hampshire Legalizes Gay 
Marriage, REUTERS, June 3, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5526 
NV20090603. 
 In contrast, after the legalization of same-sex marriage in Vermont in September, 2009, no 
new civil unions could be entered into there, but existing civil unions were not automatically 
converted into marriages. See Vermont.com, Guide to Vermont Civil Marriage, http://www. 
vermont.com/civilmarriagefaq.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
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better) systems of relationship-recognition and family law for non-
majoritarian queer and religious peoples. In doing so, I do not give up 
on the idea of ―dignity‖ (and its liberal conceptual cognates like 
―minority rights‖ and ―toleration‖), but I do aim to sketch a more 
robust yet subtle conception of dignity that is reoriented to focus on 
the relationship between it and the agency of non-majoritarian 
peoples vis-à-vis their own laws and their own lives. With such a 
religion-driven and queer-philic vision of dignity in hand, I believe 
the possibility—and necessity—of a new queer-religious friendship 
in the Obama era will be much more apparent, as will be the 
tenuousness of any future friendship between pluralistic queers and 
monistic gays and lesbians. 
III. QUEER-PHILIC VISIONS OF FAMILY LAW AND DIGNITY: DIGNITY 
AND PLURALISM 
If you have a State, you must have one attitude, one behaviour, 
one pattern of thinking. Unless we have that thinking, it would 
be very difficult to have homogeneity in this society itself, in 
this country itself. 
—Anadi Sahu, Bharatiya Janata Party politician, Member of 
Parliament (India)
71
 
There is a position—not at all unfamiliar in contemporary 
discussion—which says that to be a citizen is essentially and 
simply to be under the rule of the uniform law of a sovereign 
state . . . . [T]his is a very unsatisfactory account of political 
reality in modern societies. 
—Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury72 
 
 71. PARL. DEB., Lok Sabha XIII (July 19, 2002), available at http://parliamentofindia. 
nic.in/ls/lsdeb/ls13/ses10/190702.html. 
 72. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice: 
Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (2008), available at http://www. 
archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575. 
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A. Introduction 
The American gay and lesbian rights movement‘s present and 
unyielding focus on majoritarian marriage rights is both a historic and 
global anomaly.
73
 As Part II demonstrated, advocates for gays and 
lesbians have argued that without access to majoritarian marriage, 
there can be no gay and lesbian dignity. In this Part, I aim to bring 
into question this increasingly self-evident conclusion by presenting 
examples of family law politics from around the globe that challenge 
an ideal of liberty and justice—and marriage—for all. In doing so, I 
hope to show that one can acknowledge dignity (as well as its 
conceptual cognates) as an important goal, but also that one can 
locate it alternatively in a politics of pluralism that contests the 
desirability of majoritarian marriage for non-majoritarian peoples. 
Moreover, I show in this Part how this pluralistic politics readily 
aligns itself with (some forms of) religiosity. Ultimately then, I hope 
to suggest in this Part that one can buttress queer dignity via religious 
politics. In Part IV, I will expand upon and explore this Part‘s theme 
in the particular context of the American political and legal set-up. 
In this Part, I first discuss how recent family law politics in 
Canada and the United Kingdom complicate the dignity/legal 
uniformity equation before discussing a similarly complicating set of 
politics in India that has a much longer history. Each of the countries 
discussed in this Part is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, pluralistic 
democracy where debates over minority rights and cultural rights 
have been common. In other words, each of these three countries has 
a great deal of experience with the ―dignity question,‖ and each has 
struggled with the kind of political and legal questions that arise 
when one has a diverse population that does not possess any single 
notion of the ―good life.‖ Indeed, compared to these three countries, 
the United States is somewhat of a latecomer to discussions 
concerning dignity and family law pluralism.
74
 However, that being 
 
 73. See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 11–62, 83–122 (2008) (discussing the history and 
global context of the current push for same-sex marriage rights in the U.S.).  
 74. I say ―somewhat‖ here keeping in mind that it was American-style federalism itself 
that created the opportunity for both California and Connecticut to come up with a different 
family law system than that found in New York, for example—a system in which ―marriage‖ 
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said, my ultimate hope here is that, in the same way that American 
progressives hope that the United States will learn from foreign 
nations‘ legal experiences, progressive queer people will be inspired 
to learn from the family law politics of ―culturally foreign,‖ religious 
people. Thus, it is to such foreign/religious experience that I now 
turn. 
B. Private Ordering, Family Law Arbitration, and Dignity 
This section discusses two jurisdictions relatively familiar to the 
American lawyer, namely, Canada
75
 and the United Kingdom, where 
religious minorities have used or are using arbitration and other 
alternative dispute resolution strategies more broadly to enforce 
family law norms that differ from the majoritarian ones legislated by 
the state and enforced in state courts. In the academic literature, one 
commonly sees arbitration referred to as a type of family law ―private 
ordering.‖76 
Arbitration, like personal law discussed below, results in family 
law pluralism. However, arbitration differs from personal law in that 
the family law pluralism that exists in a personal law system is 
arguably more dependent on and more the creation of the state. 
Arbitration, on the other hand, is imagined as existing outside of the 
state, and as providing an ―alternative‖ to the state‘s monolithic 
rules.
77
 In this way, arbitration potentially allows for even greater 
 
and its homosexual sidekicks (i.e., ―domestic partnerships‖ and ―civil unions‖) differed 
minimally in economic and legal benefits. There is a common inability, however, in American 
discussions of family law pluralism to conceive of this pluralism at a level different than that of 
the fifty states. 
 75. The particular jurisdiction within Canada on which I will be focusing is Ontario. 
However, some of this discussion necessarily implicates discussion about Canada as a whole. 
Thus, depending on the situation, I will sometimes specifically refer to ―Ontario,‖ and other 
times to ―Canada‖ more generally. 
 76. See generally Ayelet Shachar, Privatizing Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from 
Religious Arbitration in Family Law, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 573, 578 (2008). 
 77. As the Boyd Report described it:  
[D]isputants may . . . give up on the quest for an agreed resolution to the[ir] dispute, 
and choose instead to have a neutral third party decide the[ir] dispute. When this is 
done by agreement of the parties to the dispute, it is known as arbitration. . . .  
 . . . [Arbitration is] private; [it does] not depend on ‗the law‘ to make [it] work, and 
[it does] not involve any governmental or state action. 
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family law pluralism than a personal law system does, as the potential 
variation in family law rules corresponds to the diversity found 
amongst cognizable couples in society as opposed to cognizable 
communities. 
In 2003, Canadian politics became preoccupied with the issue of 
family law pluralism and, in particular, efforts by the Ontario-based 
Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (―IICJ‖) to offer religiously-
premised family law arbitration services to Muslims in Canada‘s 
Ontario province. At the time, the president of this organization, Syed 
Mumtaz Ali, suggested that Canadian Muslims would not be ―good 
Muslims‖ if they did not choose to have their family law issues 
decided according to Islamic law rather than by the secular Canadian 
legal system.
78
 As one can imagine, these statements, coming as they 
did so soon after 9/11, struck a nerve in both Canadian secular and 
religious circles, and sparked much public controversy. While a great 
deal of this controversy was the result of Islamophobic and/or racist 
sentiment
79
 and overlooked the fact that Ontario Jews and Christians 
both had been using religiously-informed, legally-sanctioned 
 
MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW: PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING 
INCLUSION 9 (2004), http://www.crvawc.ca/documents/MarionBoydsReportonSharia.pdf 
[hereinafter BOYD REPORT].  
 78. See id. at 3. Prior to this 2003 conference, in a 1995 interview, Mr. Ali had also 
declared that:  
As Canadian Muslims, you have a clear choice. Do you want to govern yourself by the 
personal law of your own religion, or do you prefer governance by secular Canadian 
family law? If you choose the latter, then you cannot claim that you believe in Islam as 
a religion and a complete code of life actualized by a Prophet who you believe to be a 
mercy to all. 
Interview by Rabia Mills with Syed Mumtazali, President of the Canada Society of Muslims 
(Aug. 1995), http://muslim-canada.org/pfl.htm. Syed Mumtaz Ali‘s organization, the Canadian 
Society of Muslims, also stated in 2003 that:  
Once [a] matter comes to [Muslim arbitration], the parties will be free to choose the 
law that they wish to rely upon. This model will not exclude application of Canadian 
laws if the parties wish to do so. It is expected that the Muslim Law and associated 
Case Law created through the old Anglo-Mohammadan Law precedents would be the 
model for Personal Law cases initially, but any other Fiqh could also be relied upon if 
the parties so desire. 
The Canadian Society of Muslims, Darul-Qada: Beginnings of Muslim Civil Justice System in 
Canada, Apr. 2003, http://muslim-canada.org/news03.html. 
 79. See BOYD REPORT, supra note 77, at 68. 
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arbitration to resolve their family law disputes for years,
80
 it 
nonetheless represented a serious crisis for the Ontario government. 
As a result, a special report, known as the ―the Boyd Report,‖ was 
commissioned by the provincial Government of Ontario in 2004.
81
 
The Boyd Report‘s discussion is instructive and important here, as 
this discussion demonstrates that visions exist of the relationship 
between dignity and family law pluralism different from those 
articulated by the California and Connecticut Supreme Courts, and 
also that religious persons are at the forefront of efforts to make these 
alternative visions viable realities. 
At the time of the controversy, Ontario‘s Arbitration Act82 could 
be used to address a variety of family law (including inheritance) 
disputes outside of the courts, according to any body of law that the 
parties to the dispute chose. Certain family law issues were outside of 
the power of an arbitrator to decide in a binding manner, including 
the basic status of a marriage (i.e., an arbitrator could not declare a 
divorce; only a civil court could) and the custody of any children.
83
 
However, disputes pertaining to spousal division of property, spousal 
support, child support, and testate succession could all be 
conclusively decided outside of the state‘s courts,84 in front of any 
kind of arbitrator, according to any body of law (religious or 
otherwise) the parties chose.
85
 
In its recommendations, the Boyd Report laid out how religious 
family law arbitration should proceed in Ontario in the future. The 
report attempted to walk a careful path between the possibility of two 
 
 80. See id. at 55–57. The Boyd Report notes that representatives of one Jewish 
organization providing family law arbitration services told investigator Marion Boyd that 
Orthodox Jews are forbidden by their religion from bringing their legal disputes before ―secular 
judges.‖ Id. at 55. The report also received a submission from one Christian organization (the 
Christian Legal Fellowship) representing hundreds of Christian lawyers, law professors, and 
law students, in which it was noted that ―[m]any . . . communities [of faith] may feel that their 
core values, including the sanctity of the nuclear family are threatened by having their disputes 
resolved outside of their faith community by persons having no familiarity with their belief 
system.‖ Id. at 56. 
 81. See id. at 5. 
 82. Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17 (1991). 
 83. See BOYD REPORT, supra note 77, at 14, 16. 
 84. See generally id. at 14–28. 
 85. See id. at 12 for a discussion of parties‘ freedom to choose both the arbitrator and the 
body of law that would apply to the resolution of their dispute. 
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different kinds of legal regimes, each of which the report found 
extreme and undesirable. The first of these regimes the Boyd Report 
called ―secular absolutism,‖ which it identified as the legal system 
presently found in France.
86
 Under a secular absolutist system, ―the 
state must abstain from any involvement in religious matters, and 
religious authorities must be prohibited from having any authority 
whatsoever over matters that are regulated elsewhere by state law‖ 
presumably including family law.
87
 Under such a secular system of 
law, the state is where the definition and enforcement of one family 
law, for everyone, begins and ends. 
The second regime to be avoided, according to the Boyd Report, 
is a system whereby any group, such as Canadian Muslims, is 
allowed to establish a ―separate‖ legal regime ―distinct from [that of] 
the rest of Canadians, with the goal of political autonomy for the [] 
community in this country.‖88 Such a system is problematic because:  
Ontarians do not subscribe to the notion of “separate but 
equal” when it comes to the laws that apply to us. . . . A policy 
of compelling people to submit to different legal regimes on 
the basis of religion or culture would be counter to [Canadian] 
Charter values . . . . Equality before and under the law, and the 
existence of a single legal regime available to all Ontarians are 
the cornerstones of our liberal democratic society.
89
 
While invoking the talismanic vocabulary of ―separate but equal‖ 
to decry any (allegedly) extreme form of family law pluralism, the 
Boyd Report‘s observations as to the desirability of family law 
uniformity were clearly agonized and perhaps ambivalent. The report, 
for example, acknowledged Canada‘s rich tradition of ―separate but 
equal‖ legal regimes, most notably in historically francophone 
Quebec and the aboriginal First Nations territories. With respect to 
the legal situation of Quebec, the report noted:  
[T]he historical context clarifies why Britain tolerated the use 
of the French civil law in Quebec after defeating the French 
 
 86. See id. at 89–90. 
 87. Id. at 89 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at 88. 
 89. Id. (emphasis added). 
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and why that system of law was continued in our Constitution. 
Indeed, Canada is a delicate balancing act where protection of 
the religious, language and legal rights of both French and 
English have marked our ethos from the beginning.
90
 
With respect to the First Nations and their legal particularity in 
Canada, the Boyd Report was more adamant—and, as a result, also 
more tortured—about the inapplicability of this ―separate but equal‖ 
legal situation for any claim to an autonomous, religiously-premised 
and religion-controlled
91
 system of family law for Muslims, or any 
other non-First Nations group:  
To compare any group of people, whether they are distinct on a 
cultural, ethnic or religious basis, to the First Nations of 
Canada in this country‘s legal and historical context reveals a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the relationship between the 
Canadian state and the First Nations. From [this report‘s] 
perspective, comparisons in this direction are erroneous at 
best.
92
 
Ultimately then, the report‘s related legal conclusions here (to 
their detriment) rested on arguments about the First Nations‘ 
singularity in Canada‘s Constitution Act and other important 
legislation.
93
  
Despite rejecting a community autonomy-based model of Islamic 
family law enforcement in Ontario, the Boyd Report was not able to 
completely walk away from a difference-based model, however. 
Indeed, the Boyd Report ended up endorsing the basic system of 
optional arbitration for select family law matters that then existed in 
Ontario, while only making suggestions on the margins for reforms to 
 
 90. Id. at 79. 
 91. As the Boyd Report describes this model: ―According to such a conception of 
minority rights, the Muslim community, and other communities arbitrating family law matters 
using religious principles, would be able to do so based on whatever internal rules they adopt 
and the state would have no right to intervene.‖ Id. at 90. 
 92. Id. at 87–88. 
 93. Id. 
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this system.
94
 As the report saw it, the existing system was consistent 
with the basic Canadian commitment to multicultural policies that 
―allow[] and support[] communities‘ and individuals‘ links to 
cultures (including their religions) of origin‖95 and that support 
―inclusion which takes account of difference, not exclusion based on 
difference.‖96  
The Government of Ontario ultimately decided to reject the Boyd 
Report‘s recommendations, despite their basic endorsement of the 
status quo. Indeed, the government went so far as to make illegal any 
arbitration conducted according to any body of law other than ―the 
law of Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction.‖97 This significant 
 
 94. The Boyd Report noted:  
[It] did not find any evidence to suggest that women are being systematically 
discriminated against as a result of arbitration of family law issues. Therefore the 
Review supports the continued use of arbitration to resolve family law matters. . . . The 
Arbitration Act should continue to allow disputes to be arbitrated using religious law, 
if the safeguards currently prescribed and recommended by this Review are observed. 
BOYD REPORT, supra note 77, at 133. Many of the reforms suggested by the Boyd Report are 
relatively minor, such as requiring arbitrators to provide written reasons for their decisions and 
to keep and transmit to the government better written records of their decisions. Id. at 140. 
Some recommendations are more significant, such as the recommendation to require that the 
agreement to arbitrate a family dispute be reconfirmed at the time of the family law dispute 
instead of, say, allowing an agreement entered into at the time of the marriage to necessarily 
hold sway. Id. at 134. A potentially important recommendation is that the Arbitration Act 
should be amended to more concretely define what its requirement of a ―fair and equal process‖ 
in arbitration means. Id. at 136. 
 95. Id. at 90. Ayelet Shachar, another Canadian defender of religious family law 
arbitration, has similarly stressed how religious law can ―offer religious women a significant 
source of meaning and value,‖ Shachar, supra note 76, at 575, and as a result, can leave them 
feeling ―obliged to have at least some aspects of their marriage and divorce regulated by 
religious principles and communal institutions.‖ Id. at 604. Shachar has also argued the decision 
to ban religious arbitration is ―not an ideal normative and jurisprudential solution,‖ given that 
the government‘s ―‗out of sight, out of mind‘ approach [to religious arbitration] will probably 
not be of much assistance to vulnerable group members in blocking communal pressures to 
resolve family disputes by turning to ‗their‘ group‘s authorities which, now legally 
unrecognized, remain free of any regulatory oversight, whether ex ante or ex post.‖ Id. at 604–
05 (emphasis added). 
 96. BOYD REPORT, supra note 77, at 89. 
 97. See Family Arbitration, R.R.O. 134/07 (2007). After this amendment, the Arbitration 
Act in Ontario now reads:  
Other third-party decision-making processes in family matters 2.2 (1) When a decision 
about a matter described in clause (a) of the definition of ―family arbitration‖ in 
section 1 is made by a third person in a process that is not conducted exclusively in 
accordance with the law of Ontario or of another Canadian jurisdiction, 
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change in the law of arbitration came about largely as a result of post-
9/11 heightened anxiety concerning the loyalties and intentions of 
Canadian Muslims.
98
 Notwithstanding the contrary law enacted, the 
Boyd Report‘s discussions and conclusions are instructive and 
important, for they provide an important example of how religiously-
motivated individuals have taken the lead in jumpstarting a 
discussion about and advocating (albeit unsuccessfully) for a more 
pluralistic legal environment, and thereby contributing to the viability 
of non-majoritarian peoples.
99
 The next Part will explore how 
American queers might join in and contribute to this non-majoritarian 
project as well. 
While a certain sort of family law pluralism was shut down in 
Canada post-Boyd, the Islamophobia that underlay this move is not 
reflective of how dignity-minded individuals and governments must 
necessarily come out on the question of family law pluralism. As the 
present situation in the United Kingdom suggests, other jurisdictions, 
 
 (a) the process is not a family arbitration; and 
 (b) the decision is not a family arbitration award and has no legal effect. 2006, c. 1, 
s. 1 (2).  
Arbitration Act, R.S.O., ch. 17 (1991). 
 98. See Shachar, supra note 76, at 584; see also Haroon Siddiqui, Op-Ed, Sensationalism 
Shrouds the Debate on Sharia, TORONTO STAR, June 12, 2005, at A17. 
 99. This is not to say that religious people in Canada were united in challenging the 
preeminence of the Canadian state‘s role in regulating family relationships; they were not. In 
this respect, the Boyd Report was exemplary in its serious engagement with differences of 
opinion between Muslims (and other religious peoples) about the proper goals of the 
community—including how best to obtain respect and dignity for this community. These 
differing views spanned the spectrum from a desire to establish a completely autonomous legal 
system for Canadian Muslims, see BOYD REPORT, supra note 77, at 88, to those of the Muslim 
Canadian Congress (―MCC‖), see id. at 29–30. The MCC is described as a private national 
organization that viewed itself as ―progressive,‖ and that also claimed that the Arbitration Act 
―does not cover family disputes‖ and ―that if indeed the government takes the position . . . that 
the Arbitration Act can deal with these matters, then . . . the Arbitration Act is unconstitutional 
. . . in that . . . [it b]reaches the unwritten constitutional norms enunciated by the Supreme court 
of Canada . . . namely the rule of law, constitutionalism, federalism, and respect for minorities.‖ 
Id. But that being said, it was religious people who took the lead in instigating and defending 
the need for a re-thinking of family law uniformity in Canada, though there were others who 
also supported this agenda as well. See id. at 37, 65 & 120 for a discussion of the pro-
arbitration positions of groups like Facts Are Capable Too (―FACT‖) and Fathercraft. Such 
groups may have religious backing, but they are not explicitly religious in the way that the 
Jewish, Muslim, and Christian (e.g., Salvation Army) groups supporting arbitration in this 
Canadian report were. 
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equally afflicted by Islamophobia, might be on a different path—one 
that is more accommodating of non-majoritarian lives, whether 
radically religious or queer. 
In early 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, 
delivered a widely reported and controversial lecture in the United 
Kingdom entitled ―Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious 
Perspective.‖100 Conceived as a general talk about how to respond to 
―the presence of communities which, while no less ‗law-abiding‘ than 
the rest of the population, relate to something other than the British 
legal system alone,‖101 the Archbishop‘s words resonated widely and 
loudly in a country still recovering from the 2005 attacks on its 
capital‘s public transportation system and the fears of a Muslim 
―fifth-column‖ that these attacks engendered. Journalistic reporting of 
the lecture focused on its comments concerning the place of Islamic 
law
102
 in an ostensibly secular
103
 legal system. However, the 
Archbishop himself emphasized that he was trying to speak generally 
―about the right of religious believers . . . to opt out of certain legal 
provisions—[for example,] the problems around Roman Catholic 
adoption agencies which emerged in relation to the Sexual 
Orientation Regulations [the previous spring].‖104 
Ultimately, the Archbishop argued in his talk that ―a defence of an 
unqualified secular legal monopoly in terms of the need for a 
universalist doctrine of human right or dignity is to misunderstand the 
 
 100. See Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Foundation Lecture at the Royal 
Courts of Justice: Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective (Feb. 7, 2008), 
available at www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575.  
 101. Id. 
 102. See Ruth Gledhill & Philip Webster, Archbishop of Canterbury Argues for Islamic 
Law in Britain, TIMES, Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/ 
faith/article3328024.ece; Jonathan Petre & Andrew Porter, Adopt Sharia Law in Britain, Says 
the Archbishop of Canterbury Dr Rowan Williams, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 8, 2008, available 
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1578017/Adopt-sharia-law-in-Britain-says-the-Arch 
bishop-of-Canterbury-Dr-Rowan-Williams.html; Sharia Law in UK is „Unavoidable,‟ BBC 
NEWS, Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7232661.stm. 
 103. It is somewhat of a challenge to characterize the English legal system as ―secular‖ 
when, as the Archbishop himself acknowledges, ―the law of the Church of England is the law of 
the land.‖ Williams, supra note 72. The Archbishop goes on to note, however, that the ―daily 
operation‖ of that Church law ―is in the hands of [non-Church] authorities to whom 
considerable independence is granted.‖ Id. That being said, later on his talk, the Archbishop 
speaks admirably of what he characterizes as a necessary ―theology of law.‖ Id.  
 104. Id. 
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circumstances in which that [secular] doctrine emerged.‖105 A more 
preferable articulation of secularism, according to the Archbishop, 
would be to facilitate ―a pattern of [social and legal] relations in 
which a plurality of divers[e] and overlapping affiliations work for a 
common good, and in which groups of serious and profound 
conviction are not systematically faced with the stark alternatives of 
cultural loyalty or state loyalty.‖106 
While the Archbishop‘s widely publicized talk was a direct 
response to recent developments and concerns in the United 
Kingdom, including the intentions and loyalties of the United 
Kingdom‘s Muslim population, debates concerning the limits to legal 
pluralism in the United Kingdom had been ongoing for some time. 
Some of these debates concerned the roles and rights of a number of 
non-state Muslim legal institutions that Muslim non-governmental 
organizations have developed all over the United Kingdom over the 
past two decades.  
These institutions, or ―shari‘a councils,‖ use procedures and 
practices informed by Islamic legal and moral norms in the process of 
providing mediation and family law dispute resolution services for 
disputes arising in Muslim families.
107
 They identify themselves with 
names like ―Muslim Marriage Guidance Council,‖ ―Islamic Sharia 
Council,‖ and ―Muslim Arbitration Tribunal.‖108 Most of these 
institutions see themselves as merely mediators in Muslim couples‘ 
disagreements, offering non-binding advice to Islamic family norms. 
Some of these institutions also hear individuals‘ petitions for 
religious divorce and issue religious divorces.
109
 However, these 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See John R. Bowen, Private Arrangements: “Recognizing Sharia” in England, 
BOSTON REV., Mar./Apr. 2009. 
 108. See id. (providing a general overview of the functioning of the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal and Islamic Sharia Council). See generally Sameer Ahmed, Pluralism in British 
Islamic Reasoning: The Debate over Official Recognition of Islamic Family Law in the United 
Kingdom 50–60 (Dec. 23, 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University) (on file 
with author).  
 109. For example, John Bowen reports that at the February 2008 monthly meeting of 
scholars associated with the Islamic Sharia Council, the scholars either dissolved or asked for 
more information with respect to the seven cases that they heard as a group that month. See 
Bowen, supra note 107. All seven cases were requests by women to divorce their husbands. See 
id. For a general overview of the functions of these institutions, see Samia Bano, In Pursuit of 
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declarations of divorce have no civil law effect, since only a state 
court can declare an officially-married couple legally divorced.
110
 
Only one institution, the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, has taken the 
steps to officially register itself under the state‘s Arbitration Act, so 
that it may resolve civil disputes
111
 in a legally binding manner, using 
the tools of state-defined arbitration. 
As in Canada, Muslim opinion in the United Kingdom as to the 
desirability of establishing a distinct set of legal institutions for 
Muslims is not unanimous; there are Muslim supporters and Muslim 
detractors of efforts to establish non-state Muslim legal institutions. 
Furthermore, amongst both supporters and detractors there are 
different reasons that people give for their position vis-à-vis these 
non-state institutions.
112
 As robust as this intra-community dissension 
might be, evidence suggests nonetheless that the number of people 
 
Religious and Legal Diversity: A Response to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the „Sharia 
Debate‟ in Britain, 10 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 283, 294–95 (2008).  
 110. See Bowen, supra note 107, at 3; see also Lucy Carroll, Muslim Women and „Islamic 
Divorce‟ in England, 17 J. MUSLIM MINORITY AFF. 97 (1997). 
 111. Not all of these arbitration matters involve intra-family civil disputes. The website of 
the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal reports that they also handle ―Commercial and Debt Disputes‖ 
and ―Mosque Disputes.‖ Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, Types of Cases We Deal With, http:// 
www.matribunal.com/cases.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 112. For example, some Muslim supporters of these non-state institutions have disdain for 
majority practices and values. Such Muslims ―see Western society as aimless and rootless, 
marred by increasing vandalism, crime, juvenile delinquency, the collapse of marriages, 
growing number of illegitimate children, and near constant stress and anxiety. They view Islam 
as the positive alternative.‖ Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim Alternative Dispute Resolution and Neo-
Ijtihad in England, 2 ALTERNATIVES: TURK. J. INT‘L REL. 121–22 (2003). 
 Others‘ support might be characterized as less disdainful than fearful, especially of state-
sponsored Islamophobia. In this respect, Yilmaz notes the disparity in how English Jews and 
Sikhs are protected under the Race Relations Act, but not Muslims, and that ―[a]s a result, there 
has been widespread alienation from the state among [Muslims].‖ Id. at 122. 
 Finally, other Muslims worry less about majority ill-will than they do about majority 
cultural incompetence. See SONIA NURIN SHAH-KAZEMI, UNTYING THE KNOT: MUSLIM 
WOMEN, DIVORCE, AND THE SHARIAH 53-5, 71-7 (2001) for examples and discussion of 
incompetence on the behalf of British (non-Muslim) lawyers giving advice to their Muslim 
clients on both English and Islamic law. In one instance, one of these lawyers drew up a 
talaqnama for his client, in which he had his client—a woman—attempt to divorce her husband 
by pronouncing ‗I TALAK YOU‘ thrice. See id. at 54-5. It should be noted that this is not an 
instance of a woman exercising a delegated right of divorce (correctly, at least), as the woman‘s 
declaration of talaq does not take the proper form for the exercise of such a delegated right. See 
WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS, TALAQ-I-TAFWID: THE MUSLIM WOMEN‘S 
CONTRACTUAL ACCESS TO DIVORCE—AN INFORMATION KIT 34 (1996), available at http:// 
www.wluml.org/node/390. 
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using the services of these non-state Muslim institutions has been on 
a steady rise.
113
  
While the future direction of the debate over official recognition 
of Islamic family law in the United Kingdom is unpredictable, the 
fact that the head of the Church of England is making speeches 
advocating a pluralistic legal regime that could directly benefit many 
existing Muslim communities and institutions suggests that 
monumental change (including monumental religious-political 
realignment) is afoot in the United Kingdom. Moreover, whatever the 
outcome of this debate, its existence helps demonstrate how, yet 
again, members of religious communities have taken the lead in 
arguing against the coercive application of majority-defined state 
family law norms, and for the creation and viability of non-
majoritarian political and legal spaces 
C. Personal Law, ”Separate But Equal” Family Laws, and the Rights 
of Non-Majoritarian Peoples 
The debates in Canada and the United Kingdom concerning 
family law pluralism are, in part, about ―private ordering,‖ or the 
ability of people to ―privately‖ construct alternatives to the state‘s 
monolithic family law rules, norms, and assumptions. However, 
another model of family law pluralism, namely, that of ―personal 
law,‖ is also widely practiced and debated around the globe. In 
contrast to the private ordering model, this form of family law 
pluralism is one where the (public) state itself is involved in defining 
and enforcing different alternatives in family regulation.
114
 Personal 
law systems are crucially important to study and understand at this 
point in time, as the family law system that is emerging in the United 
 
 113. The Islamic Sharia Council, one such non-state Muslim legal institution, reports that 
from 1982–1995, 1500 cases were filed with it. From 1996-2009, however, at least 5500 cases 
were filed. Islamic Sharia Council, Statistics, http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-us/about-us-
9.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 114. States that have personal law systems will differ to the extent they will allow 
communities to legislate, administer, and otherwise enforce their particular personal laws. 
There is no single model of a personal law system, though there are commonalities between 
such systems. For a comparison of two widely-studied personal law systems, see Marc Galanter 
& Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. L. REV. 101, 
115–20 (2000). 
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States (both before and after Proposition 8) strongly resembles the 
―personal law‖ approach to family law, whereby different 
communities are governed by different regimes of family law.
115
 
India stands out as a country where the administration of family 
law is organized around a personal law model. India‘s personal law 
system is premised on people‘s religiously communal 
identifications.
116
 Reference to India‘s personal law system means the 
system of Indian family law whereby Hindus, Muslims, Christians, 
and others are governed by different family law codes, practices, and 
norms.
117
  
For example, in this system of family law, one finds a ―Hindu 
Marriage Act‖ and also an ―Indian Christian Marriage Act.‖ The 
Hindu Marriage Act also governs Hindu divorces, while a ―Indian 
Divorce Act‖ governs Christian divorces, and a ―Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriages Act‖ governs some kinds of Muslim divorces.118 
There are also numerous other examples of these types of statutes in 
India, as well as a large body of religion-specific, judicially-
developed common-law relating to family issues.
119
 
While the motivations behind personal law systems have been 
complex and dynamic over the course of history,
120
 today they are in 
 
 115. Traditionally, personal law has been viewed as a kind of legal system which shares 
little with territorially-premised pluralistic legal systems. I believe this view of things is wrong, 
however. See generally Jeffrey A. Redding, Slicing the American Pie: Federalism and Personal 
Law, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 941 (2008). Moreover, in light of the pattern in U.S. state 
laws that is emerging with respect to the definition and enforcement of marriages versus 
domestic partnerships (or civil unions), it is time to question any easy conclusion about the 
existence of sharp differences between the American system of family law and personal law 
systems. Indeed, just as Muslims and Hindus form families according to different laws in India, 
now so do homosexuals and heterosexuals utilize different family laws in some American 
states. 
 116. Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 114, at 103. 
 117. Presently in India, the central government (and, to a much lesser degree, state 
governments) legislates on different religious communities‘ personal laws. Furthermore, there 
is a relatively unified, hierarchically organized national judiciary in India that enforces and 
administers this legislation, as well as the large amount of uncodified religious personal law that 
is found in judicial precedents. See id. at 106–07. 
 118. See id. at 109 n.42. 
 119. There is also family law (for example, the recently-enacted ―Protection of Women 
from Domestic Violence Act‖), which is not administered along communitarian lines. 
 120. India‘s personal law system can be traced back at least to the 1772 decision by Warren 
Hastings, the British viceroy for India at the time: ―in all Suits regarding Inheritance, Marriage, 
Caste, and all other religious Usages or Institutions, [apply] the Laws of the Koran with respect 
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very large part ―intended to help ethnic groups and religious 
minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it 
hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of 
the dominant society.‖121 Moreover, examining personal law systems 
in India and elsewhere, one often finds that ―second class‖ citizens—
for example, Muslims and Sikhs
122
 in the case of Hindu-majority 
India—often vociferously oppose any effort to amalgamate them into 
a common, unitary family law system.
123
  
 
to [Muslims], and those of the Shaster with respect to [Hindus].‖ A Plan for the Administration 
of Justice (1772), in SELECTIONS FROM THE STATE PAPERS OF THE GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF 
INDIA Vol. 2, 290, 295–96 (G.W. Forrest ed., 1910). For a discussion of this British policy, see 
Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 114, at 106; see also M.B. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 58–85, 94–116 (1975). 
 While one might have expected otherwise from such an ambitious announcement, 
ultimately Hastings‘s decision was only fully implemented in the areas of marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, and adoption law, as well as in the management of religious endowments. After 
independence, and after much debate, the post-colonial Indian state decided to continue this 
basic split between universally oriented criminal law and personally oriented family law. 
 121. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS 31 (1995). Rina Verma Williams has characterized the post-colonial retention of 
personal law systems as ―a way to avert ethnic unrest and preserve cultural autonomy in 
multiethnic societies.‖ RINA VERMA WILLIAMS, POSTCOLONIAL POLITICS AND PERSONAL 
LAWS: COLONIAL LEGAL LEGACIES AND THE INDIAN STATE 7 (2006). Finally, India‘s post-
Independence leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, himself remarked that ―we do not dare touch the 
Moslems [with respect to their personal law] because they are in a minority and we do not wish 
the Hindu majority to do it. These are personal laws and so they will remain for the Moslems, 
unless they want to change them.‖ TIBOR MENDE, CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. NEHRU 57 
(1956). But see MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND 
THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 111 (1996) (arguing that colonial-era legal pluralism ―was 
more an expression of power relations in a colonial society than a recognition and tolerance of 
any multicultural diversity‖). 
 122. See Himanshi Dhawan & Subodh Ghildiyal, After Hindus, divorce could get hassle-
free for Sikhs too, TIMES OF INDIA, June 11, 2010 (quoting Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management 
Committee member Paramjit Singh Sarna as saying ―We have separate set of Sikh rituals and 
we would like to be registered under the Sikh Marriage Act rather than the Hindu Marriage Act 
as we have to do now. It is a matter of our identity and a legal recognition to Anand Karaj‖), 
available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Divorce-may-now-get-easier-for-Hindus-
Sikhs-demand-the-same/articleshow/6034264.cms. 
 123. It is important to note here that at India‘s independence, conservative Hindu 
organizations also opposed the newly independent state‘s (ultimately successful) attempts to 
reformulate Hindu personal law, using arguments about the inappropriateness of state 
―interference‖ in religious personal laws. See WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 104–14. Later, this 
radical brand of Hindu politics veered its focus, such that ―[i]n the 1980s, religious identity for 
the Muslim community became virtually coterminous with the preservation of their personal 
law. For some Hindus . . . Indian national identity became virtually coterminous with forcing 
the Muslim community to give up their personal law.‖ Id. at 127. 
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One important and dramatic example of minority resistance to 
majoritarian family law in India is helpful to examine here. In the 
mid-1980s, the Indian political scene became consumed by what is 
widely known as ―the Shah Bano crisis.‖124 This controversy, whose 
reverberations are still strongly felt today, resulted from a decision 
handed down by the Indian Supreme Court: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. 
Shah Bano Begum.
125
 The question presented by this case was 
whether the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure‘s requirement that a 
man indefinitely financially maintain his ex-wife after a divorce if 
she is ―unable to maintain herself‖126 was applicable to Muslim men, 
who arguably have more limited responsibilities toward their ex-
wives under classical Islamic family law.
127
 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court determined that the Code of Criminal Procedure‘s requirements 
superseded any contradictory Muslim personal law rules and 
requirements,
128
 and also that nothing in Muslim personal law 
forbade indefinite maintenance to a divorced wife ―who is unable to 
maintain herself.‖129 
The opinion ignited large protests by conservative Muslims across 
India (and smaller counter-protests by a number of dissident Muslim 
women and their allies).
130
 Eventually, then-Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi and his government acquiesced to conservative Muslim 
 
 124. See Redding, supra note 115, at 966–68. 
 125. Mohd. Ahmed Kahn v. Shah Bano Begum, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945. 
 126. INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. § 125(1)(a). 
 127. Under most classical interpretations of Islamic divorce law, it is generally the rule that 
a man is required to financially maintain his ex-wife until she has menstruated three times, post-
divorce. See DAVID PEARL & WERNER MENSKI, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 182–84, 280–82 (3d ed. 
1998). 
 128. Mohd. Ahmed Khan, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. at 952–53. 
 129. See id. at 949–53. Arguably, the first holding was sufficient to have settled the case, 
and it was gratuitous and provocative for the Supreme Court to have interpreted the Muslim 
community‘s personal law. This seems especially the case given that other portions of the 
Court‘s opinion took a patronizing tone in regards to the content of such personal law. The lead 
paragraph in this opinion included the following remarks: ―it is alleged that the ‗fatal point in 
Islam is the degradation of woman‘ . . . . To the Prophet is ascribed the statement, hopefully 
wrongly, that ‗Woman was made from a crooked rib, and if you try to bend it straight, it will 
break; therefore treat your wives kindly.‘‖ Id. at 956. 
 130. See Kirti Singh, The Constitution and Muslim Personal Law, in FORGING IDENTITIES: 
GENDER, COMMUNITIES AND THE STATE IN INDIA 96, 101–03 (Zoya Hasan ed., 1994); 
WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 145 (documenting smaller size of counter-protests by progressive 
Muslims). 
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demands and passed a law to eliminate Muslim—and only Muslim—
women‘s rights to petition for and receive indefinite post-divorce 
maintenance from their ex-husbands.
131
 While the legal effect of this 
relatively recent addition to India‘s personal law system has been 
whittled back over time, the statute still exists and many Muslim 
political and social organizations would very likely resist its removal 
intensely.
132
 
The Shah Bano crisis, and its aftermath, demonstrates that many 
people in India, both progressive and conservative, view family law 
pluralism as not only coexisting with the dignity of minorities, but 
actually as somewhat of a prerequisite for that dignity. While it is 
true that there are many feminists in India who have worked against 
the personal law system, it is safe to say that the momentum on this 
issue within the Indian feminist community has been seized by 
religious feminists. These religious feminists are working for more 
women-friendly versions of personal law. However, such a project 
has goals quite different from delegating family law to patriarchal 
others, whether those ―others‖ be patriarchal authority figures within 
religious communities or within the secular state itself.
133
 
 
 131. See The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, No. 25 of 1986. In 
response to this legislation, cries of ―appeasement‖ were effectively raised by Hindu nationalist 
quarters, which eventually helped lead to the national electoral successes of the Hindu-
nationalist BJP political party. These successes, in turn, led to a severe polarization in Hindu-
Muslim relations in India, a corresponding increase in violence between the two communities, 
and the drawing of new and sharper boundaries between the two communities. These 
communal problems, and the challenges they present for legislation and judicial decision 
making in the area of personal law, persist today. 
 132. For the results of different surveys of Muslim public opinion on the issue of personal 
law reform, see WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 58. A 1996 survey found that sixty-seven percent 
of Muslims (and over fifty percent of Christians) favored the retention of India‘s personal law 
system, while only forty-two percent of Hindus favored keeping this system. Yogendra Yadav, 
The Maturing of a Democracy, INDIA TODAY, Aug. 31, 1996, at 28, 41. Another 1995 survey of 
two hundred Muslim women found that while only forty-six percent of respondents thought that 
Muslim personal law in India should be reformed, only fourteen percent would go so far as to 
eradicate the Indian method of organizing family law along a personal law model itself. 
Sabeeha Bano, Muslim Women‟s Voices: Expanding Gender Justice under Muslim Law, 30 
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2981, 2982 (1995). All of these results should be appropriately 
contextualized and qualified by noting both the enormous size of India‘s Muslim population—
approximately 150 million—and the large number of class, caste, regional, and sectarian 
differences that internally differentiate this population. 
 133. See, for example, supra note 132 for results of a poll of Muslim women that are 
consistent with this observation. More generally, Madhavi Sunder has noted how 
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The existence of religious feminists is evidence of intense 
disagreements between different members of religious communities 
concerning the proper content of the family law that should apply to 
the community.
134
 Unfortunately, it is often the case that these 
disagreements are resolved at the expense of women. That being duly 
noted, the nature of these (fortunate) debates nonetheless 
demonstrates that the legal and political debates that accompany 
many personal law systems possess a very different framework as to 
the relationship between dignity and family law pluralism than that 
framework found in the California and Connecticut supreme court 
opinions. In these systems with communally-premised personal law, 
both refuge and dignity are found outside of the confines of 
majoritarian marriage and family law. 
D. Conclusion 
The California and Connecticut Supreme Courts viewed gay and 
lesbian—and—queer dignity as inextricably linked to formal equality 
and access to the heterosexual, secular institution of majoritarian 
marriage. This account of dignity is not necessarily wrong, but, as my 
discussion in this Part (and the next) suggests, this account involves 
more assertion than analysis and ignores the ways in which numerous 
people around the globe have felt that something other than mimicry 
of the majority is what creates a feeling of dignity in their lives. In 
this respect, religious people amongst others have been leaders in not 
 
[i]ndividuals in the modern world [are] increasingly demand[ing] change within their 
religious communities in order to bring their faith in line with democratic norms and 
practices. Call this the New Enlightenment: Today, individuals [are] seek[ing] reason, 
equality, and liberty not just in the public sphere, but also in the private spheres of 
religion, culture, and family. 
Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2003). Finally, Kumkum 
Sangiri has remarked on the perhaps less-than-obvious patriarchal objectives of India‘s 
ostensibly liberatory/secular state by noting that ―[b]eneath the opposition between a state-
imposed uniform civil code and personal laws that are sought to be reformed from ‗within‘ a 
community . . . lies an unresolved but entirely patriarchal concern: who will control and 
regulate women. . . ?‖ Kumkum Sangiri, Politics of Diversity: Religious Communities and 
Multiple Patriarchies, 30 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 3287, 3296 (1995). 
 134. One might note that, at the very least, this contention is on the table in India, whereas 
legal and judicial discussions concerning same-sex marriage in the United States obscure and 
ignore debate within the gay and lesbian community about the desirability of marriage.  
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only contesting majoritarian hegemony, but also in putting in place 
the social, political, and legal infrastructure necessary for living a 
non-subordinated life. Indeed, by being active authors of their law 
and exercising both authority over and responsibility for their law, 
these religious people have been exemplars of how to live a life with 
dignity.
135
 
Ultimately, then, dignity is a much more complicated, contested, 
and dynamic concept than contemporary gay and lesbian same-sex 
marriage advocates, including supportive courts, appear willing to 
acknowledge. Moreover, protecting the dignity of queer people may 
very well require something different than amalgamating queers into 
a heterosexually-dominated majoritarian marriage regime, in which 
queers (as well as gays and lesbians) will continually be 
democratically outmatched with respect to this regime‘s substantive 
content and norms. In the next Part, I explore how new and better 
queer friends might facilitate the new and better queer agendas in 
which I am interested. 
IV. NEW AGENDAS, NEW FRIENDS 
My discussion in the preceding two Parts has demonstrated that 
mainstream American gay and lesbian understandings and 
implementations of dignity are out of touch with much global 
understanding and practice vis-à-vis this concept, as well as the 
welfare of queer people in the United States itself.
136
  
It is possible that, in the future, gay and lesbian voices will be 
raised against the gay and lesbian organizations and individuals who 
 
 135. And even here, the picture as to religious people and politics is itself complicated, 
with not all religious people being interested in either their own or others‘ agency. For example, 
in India, religious nationalist parties have recently been the parties most interested in family law 
monism. See supra note 123. 
 136. Clearly, the fact that religious minorities around the world are not using dignity claims 
to argue for their amalgamation into majoritarian marital and family law does not necessarily 
preclude gays, lesbians, or queers in the United States from (correctly) doing so. There are real 
differences between other countries‘ religious minorities and America‘s sexual minorities and 
the histories of the family law systems in each country. For one, many religions have had 
family law traditions that predate secular states and secular norms by centuries. Gays, lesbians, 
and queers, on the other hand, have often been excluded or excommunicated from the family 
altogether. It would not be surprising if each kind of community or cultural grouping views the 
family differently and needs different things to feel ―whole‖ or dignified. 
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are seeking to institute hegemonic notions of dignity, family, and 
law. However, until this happens, queer people need new friends, and 
I argue in this Part that a new American queer friendship with the 
American radical religious right holds real promise for the Obama era 
and beyond. 
While many people will be skeptical of such a friendship 
proposal, I demonstrate here both the attractiveness and workability 
of this queer/religious friendship via two different discussions. The 
first discussion is an explicitly affirmative discussion and concerns 
how this queer/religious friendship could and should work on behalf 
of many possible legal alternatives to majoritarian marriage.  
The second discussion is a more cautionary one, in that it explores 
how ―left/right friendships‖ can easily go bad and effectively end up 
replicating the kind of monistic family law politics that I have 
criticized in this Article. Specifically, in this second discussion, I 
caution against any future queer/religious friendship that replicates 
the friendship that recently budded in a federal district court in San 
Francisco between Theodore Olson and David Boies. As I discuss, 
the friendship between these two well-known, politically-affiliated 
lawyers, one Republican and the other Democratic, has been a 
jurispathic one, and is not the kind of friendship that I would want to 
result from this Article‘s arguments. That being said, Olson and 
Boies‘s friendship has also been jurisgenerative in some limited 
respects, and I will conclude this discussion by exploring the 
queer/religious potential that attaches to a set of alternative legal 
arguments put forward by the City of San Francisco when it 
petitioned to intervene in the Olson-Boies litigation.  
In this Part, then, I will bring my discussion from the previous 
Parts ―home‖ to argue a specific and plausible kind of friendship 
between American queers and the American radical religious right. 
Certainly, previous work by American queer theorists
137
 has strongly 
echoed the critique made by the radically religious concerning the 
monopoly that state-enforced majoritarian marriage enjoys in many 
places. What has been missing, however, from this queer critique is a 
way to effectuate it via politics and law. Given that (missing) reality, 
 
 137. See supra notes 8–10. 
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in what follows I will explore how a joint queer/religious political 
and legal effort could effectively work to displace majoritarian 
marriage from the universe‘s center. I believe that this de-centering 
move would allow not only for a greater constellation of relationship-
recognition schemes, but also a different kind of politics: namely, one 
where queers and the radically religious can collaborate with and 
befriend each other, and thereby open up a world of heretofore 
unknown possibilities that are only fitting for the itself-unprecedented 
Obama era. 
A. “Separate but Equal” American Family Laws: The More, The 
Queerer 
While there are many different political and social projects on 
which a queer/religious friendship of the sort that I suggest in this 
Article could work,
138
 here I discuss one directly related to my 
critique in this Article (as well as my previous work)
139
 of the ways in 
which gay and lesbian same-sex marriage advocates are promoting a 
peculiar understanding of the relationship between dignity and legal 
pluralism. This proposed project concerns the development of a legal 
infrastructure both permitting and encouraging of relationship-
recognition alternatives that are separate from—and potentially better 
than
140—majoritarian marriage. In broader terms, such a project 
would work to much more deeply institute a culture of legal 
pluralism in American family law, as opposed to a culture of legal 
monism. 
Of course, legal pluralism in the context of American family law 
is not a totally new development and, hence, neither is my broad 
suggestion here. After all, as American federalism has been 
understood and practiced, each of the fifty states retains a great deal 
of sovereign power over the family law which is legislated and 
enforced within each state‘s borders. Oddly enough, however, the 
parallels between the ―separate but equal‖ jurisdiction over marriage 
and other aspects of family law that each of the fifty states enjoys, 
 
 138. See supra pp. 223–24. 
 139. See Redding, supra note 19. 
 140. See generally id. 
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and the ―separate but equal‖ family law regimes which mixed-sex 
and same-sex couples enjoy within some states,
141
 has largely been 
overlooked in today‘s controversies over same-sex marriage. 
Other aspects of legal pluralism in the context of American family 
law have also been neglected in the current debates over same-sex 
marriage. For example, within the past fifteen years, Arizona, 
Arkansas, and Louisiana each have created within their own borders 
a non-majoritarian marital option that mixed-sex couples may choose 
when registering their relationships with the state. This alternative 
form of relationship-recognition has been denoted ―covenant 
marriage‖ by all three states. Covenant marriages differ from non-
covenant marriages, in that:  
[C]ovenant spouses agree to restrict their pursuit of a ―no-
fault‖ divorce, and by virtue of the premarital counseling, do 
so knowingly and deliberately. . . . Thus, the covenant 
marriage law permits an immediate divorce for proof of fault 
by the other spouse in more circumstances than the law 
applicable to ―standard‖ marriages. In contrast, in the absence 
of fault, the covenant marriage law requires significantly more 
time living separate and apart.
142
 
Covenant marriages, then, are both more difficult to enter because 
of their requirement of pre-marital counseling and to exit because of 
their restrictions on the availability of no-fault divorce.
143
 
Certainly, people can and have supported the availability of 
covenant marriages for non-religious reasons.
144
 However, covenant 
marriages have had the most vibrant support from religious people 
and organizations, including some of the same ones that are opposed 
 
 141. For more discussion of the disconnects between the discussion of commonplace 
American forms of pluralism, such as federalism, and the discussion of other kinds of 
pluralism, see generally Redding, supra note 115. 
 142. Katherine Shaw Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides, Covenant Marriage and the Law of 
Conflicts of Laws, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1085, 1097–98 (1999). For more information on a 
specific covenant marriage law, including details of its passage and legal and other objections to 
the law, see Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana‟s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step toward a More 
Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929 (1998). 
 143. See generally Nichols, supra note 142. 
 144. Id. at 930. 
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to opening majoritarian marriage to same-sex couples.
145
 
Accordingly, the covenant marriage movement can be properly 
viewed as a product of a religious politics that is skeptical of the 
prevailing model of marriage available in the contemporary United 
States. As they have been elsewhere around the world then, religious 
people have been at the forefront of contemporary efforts in the 
United States to create agency-enhancing alternatives to majoritarian 
marriage as well. 
Interestingly, radically religious people faced some of the same 
objections to their legally pluralistic family law proposals that others 
have faced when trying to counter advocates of legal monism—for 
example, mainstream gay and lesbian advocates of majoritarian 
marriage. In this respect, some of the major controversies over 
covenant marriage, as with same-sex relationship-recognition, 
coalesced around issues of nomenclature. In what follows, I will 
explore how the resolution—or, rather, ignoring—of such 
nomenclature ―controversies‖ illustrates why a future queer/religious 
collaboration and friendship vis-à-vis family law pluralism might 
very well work. 
With respect to its creation of a ―special‖ kind of marriage, 
covenant marriage, at least initially, faced a certain amount of 
opposition from religious clergy and commentators.
146
 For many, the 
basic concern appeared to be that the newly available covenant 
marriages might imply that non-covenantal marriages could or should 
be taken less seriously. For example, reacting to the idea of covenant 
marriage, one columnist remarked that she thought that it was ―kind 
of insulting . . . to say that [all couples not in covenant marriages] are 
not really married, that they are in marriage lite, L-I-T-E.‖147 
Motivated by the same concern, a Reverend James Lindsay was 
 
 145. See Scott L. Feld, Katherine Brown Rosier & Amy Manning, Christian Right as Civil 
Right: Covenant Marriage and a Kinder, Gentler, Moral Conservatism, 44 REV. RELIGIOUS 
RES. 173 (2002). For more recent covenant marriage activism, see In Support of Senate Bill 
168—Covenant Marriage: Hearing before the Judicial Proceedings Comm., 2008 Leg., 425th 
Sess. (Md. 2008) (statement of Peter Sprigg, Vice President for Policy, Family Research 
Council), available at http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=T508B01. 
 146. See Nichols, supra note 142, at 956 (describing religious and other opposition to 
covenant marriage‘s nomenclature). 
 147. Id. at 956 (quoting Covenant marriages: New Louisiana Law Makes It Harder to 
Divorce, ABC NEWS NIGHTLINE, Transcript, Aug. 20, 1997). 
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quoted as saying: ―‗When I got married, it was me, my spouse, and 
God. Wasn‘t that good enough?‘‖148 And somewhat similarly, a voice 
from the academy has worried about the implications of creating a 
―marital sub-status‖ off of which private entities might piggyback to 
offer, for example, less favorable insurance rates or reduced 
employee benefits to those who ―only‖ have a non-covenantal 
marriage.
149
 
As interesting and thought-provoking as such nomenclature 
concerns about covenant marriage versus majoritarian marriage have 
been, they clearly have not succeeded in capturing the imagination of 
potential litigants, courts, or the public. While only a few 
jurisdictions have chosen to offer covenant marriage and, in the 
jurisdictions where covenant marriage is available, this kind of 
marriage is less prevalent than non-covenantal marriage,
150
 the 
covenant marriage relationship-recognition regime and its potential 
implications have not faced anything like the kind of full-on frontal 
court assault that domestic partnership and civil union regimes 
have—especially with respect to their ostensibly denigrating non-
―marital‖ choice of relationship nomenclature.151 
The reasons for both the public and the law‘s differential attitude 
about the nomenclature implications of covenant marriages versus 
 
 148. Id. (quoting Sandy Banisky, Altering the Way to the Altar; License; Louisiana‟s New 
„Covenant Marriage‟ Option Forces Couples to Slow down and Act Cautiously. But So Far, 
Few are Choosing It, BALT. SUN, Oct. 20, 1997, at 1A). Katharine Bartlett also reports that 
religious opposition to covenant marriage arose because of, for example, Episcopalian 
resistance to returning to any kind of ―unworkable‖ fault-based divorce regime, Roman 
Catholic resistance to pre-marital counseling in which the prospect of divorce is mentioned, and 
evangelical worries that creating a two-tier system of marriage might create a third tier, namely, 
same-sex marriage. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 809, 832 n.92 (1998) (citing Michael J. McManus, Divorce is Difficult in 
“Covenant Marriage,‖ FRESNO BEE, Nov. 29, 1997, at A13; Bruce Nolan, Bishops Back off 
Covenant and Marriage, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 30, 1997, at A1). 
 149. See Bartlett, supra note 148, at 833–34. 
 150. Statistics that were collected shortly after the making available of covenant marriage 
in Louisiana suggest that very few people choose a covenant form of marriage. See Nichols, 
supra note 142, at 968–69. However, these are admittedly old statistics and are not necessarily 
representative of the situation today. More than a decade later, it may likely be the case that 
more people are aware of the availability of this marital option.  
 151. For a provocative and imaginative student note imagining what such a court challenge 
would look like, however, see Melissa Lawton, The Constitutionality of Covenant Marriage 
Laws, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2498–2505 (1998). 
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same-sex domestic partnerships and civil unions—especially in 
jurisdictions such as California and Connecticut where the 
differences between mixed-sex and same-sex relationship-recognition 
regimes were almost entirely ones of nomenclature—are clearly 
complicated. That being said, previous queer interest in and 
discussion of covenant marriage provides, I believe, significant 
insight into the social epistemology that has not only sustained the 
law‘s ability to look the other way vis-à-vis covenant marriage‘s 
potential implications, but also a social epistemology that could 
sustain a future queer/religious friendship. 
In this respect, well-known queer legal activist and scholar Paula 
Ettelbrick has addressed the issue of covenant marriage in her 
scholarly work in a quite intriguing and also revealing manner. 
Proposing the creation of a ―continuum of family recognition 
options,‖152 Ettelbrick has written: ―I present the option of covenant 
marriage primarily to illustrate the point that a state may adopt co-
existing forms of marriage. . . . In the interest of equality, covenant 
marriage, of course, should be open to same-sex couples, though I am 
quite happy to leave it as is.‖153  
While Ettelbrick‘s comments here as to the mixed-sex bona fides 
of covenant marriage are at one level humorously snarky, at a deeper 
level they are also entirely suggestive of why covenant marriage 
(nomenclature) has existed with so little legal or social scrutiny. As I 
see it, Ettelbrick is divining and expressing a widespread social 
sentiment and epistemology which might be paraphrased as follows: 
―Heterosexuals can have covenant marriage to themselves because it 
works for (some of) them; gays, lesbians, and queers are different 
than heterosexuals and need different relationship-recognition models 
and so the availability of covenant marriage shouldn‘t matter to 
them.‖ In other words: different strokes are for different folks. 
Clearly then, in addition to implicitly suggesting here how 
covenant marriage escapes (as it does) any calamitous charges of 
―separate but equal,‖ Ettelbrick is also endorsing some sort of 
radically pluralistic family law regime. This endorsement 
 
 152. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Avoiding a Collision Course in Lesbian and Gay Family 
Advocacy, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 753, 758 (2000). 
 153. Id. at 758–59 (emphasis added). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 33:211 
 
 
demonstrates some extant queer support for family law pluralism in 
the United States. And, as discussed, covenant marriage itself 
provides evidence of support for family law pluralism from the 
radically religious as well. Ultimately then, in her discussion of 
―special‖ laws for all ―special‖ peoples—whether religious or 
queer—Ettelbrick suggests a social epistemology and mechanics that 
could very well make a queer/religious friendship viable. 
Moreover, Ettelbrick here is not alone in resisting
154
 the simplistic 
hierarchy that so many mainstream gay and lesbian activists, 
commentators, and judges have wanted to construct for same-sex 
relationship-recognition regimes (e.g., ―domestic partnership‖) versus 
mixed-sex relationship-recognition regimes (i.e., marriage). In doing 
so, she writes in a queer tradition of skepticism toward the idea of 
universalistic frameworks involving either tiers
155
 or centers, from 
which either authority or prestige necessarily declines or dissipates in 
any predictable fashion. Not surprisingly, such a queer tradition does 
not view majoritarian marriage in a particularly worshipful light. For 
example, Nancy Polikoff‘s work,156 in which Polikoff develops an 
approach to family law that she calls ―valuing all families,‖157 is also 
important and relevant queer work. Polikoff‘s approach recognizes 
that:  
 
 154. I say ―resisting‖ here instead of somewhat stronger ―rejecting‖ because there is some 
ambivalence in Ettelbrick‘s discussion. And, indeed, while there is much desirable in 
Ettelbrick‘s proposal to de-center majoritarian marriage in future family law, some of her 
discussion seems to undermine this goal and, as a result, seems unnecessary and/or 
questionable. For example, I believe that Ettelbrick concedes too easily the ―deep cultural 
meaning associated with marriage‖ and its ―potent and strongly symbolic‖ character. Id. Given 
this ―deep culture meaning,‖ Ettelbrick strongly believes that ―traditional marriage‖ should be 
open to same-sex couples. Id. at 759. However, that being the case, she is (confusingly) snarky 
about the prospect of same-sex couples entering ―covenant marriages.‖ See supra note 152 and 
accompanying text. 
 155. For this reason, I resist using Joel Nichols‘s terminology of ―multi-tiered‖ marriage in 
this Article. See Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York 
and Louisiana to the International Community, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 135 (2007). I 
believe that such terminology too strongly suggests a vertical, hierarchical ordering of family 
law regimes, whereas I am interested in how we can think of legal pluralism in more horizontal 
terms. 
 156. The fullest statement of Polikoff‘s beliefs can be found in her recent book from 2008. 
See POLIKOFF, supra note 73. 
 157. Id. at 5. 
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In every area of law that matters to same-sex couples, such as 
healthcare decision making, government and employee 
benefits, and the right to raise children, [non-marital] laws 
already exist in some places that could form the basis for just 
family policies for those who can‘t marry or enter civil unions 
or register their domestic partnerships, as well as for those who 
don‘t want to or who simply don‘t.158 
For Polikoff then, such non-marriage-premised laws could be 
increased in number, as an alternative to merely pursuing and further 
entrenching the current practice of handing out healthcare, 
employment, and parental rights solely through the monopolistic 
institution of (majoritarian) marriage—whether mixed-sex or same-
sex.
159
  
The work of Polikoff, Ettelbrick, and other queer legal theorists 
and activists,
160
 suggests that majoritarian marriage should be taken 
off of its pedestal, and more pluralistic relationship-recognition 
schemes be instituted. Ultimately, then, both the queer and the 
 
 158. Id. at 9. 
 159. See id.  
 160. On the ―right‖ side of the political spectrum, economist Douglas Allen has similarly 
argued that: ―[W]hen different human relationships fall under a ‗one size fits all‘ law, the result 
is a bad fit for everyone. Alternations to heterosexual institutions resulting from [issues] arising 
in homosexual relations will have profound effects on heterosexual marriage, and heterosexual 
pressures on marriage law ill likely be inappropriate for homosexual couples.‖ Douglas W. 
Allen, An Economic Assessment of Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 949, 
954 (2006). Allen proceeds to argue the appropriateness of two different relationship-
recognition regimes, one for mixed-sex couples and another for same-sex couples. And indeed, 
while Allen concludes his piece by suggesting only these two different relationship-recognition 
regimes, namely ―heterosexual marriage‖ and ―homosexual marriage,‖ see id. at 980, his 
comments elsewhere suggest that he might actually favor two different regimes for homosexual 
themselves—one for gay male couples and another for lesbian female couples—and, hence, 
three different relationship-recognition regimes overall. See id. at 959. 
 My crude description here of Allen‘s politics as ―right‖ leaning does not come from his 
policy prescriptions, some of which I endorse, but on his teleological utilizations elsewhere in 
his writing of social Darwinian/economic efficiency thinking to arrive at conclusions such as 
the following: 
Poorly designed laws lead to lobbying efforts and appeals that result either in 
successful regulation of marriage or in unsuccessful marriages, which in turn lead to 
low fertility, low quality off-spring, and ultimately a decline in the society. Either way, 
the Darwinian conclusion is inevitable: the general institutions of marriage we observe 
today are efficient, as they are the result of centuries of evolution. 
Id. at 956. 
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radically religious in the United States share in a profound skepticism 
of, not only majoritarian marriage, but also of the legal monism that 
allows marriage to be majoritarian in the first place. This is shared 
ground where friendship could bloom. In comparison, mainstream 
gay and lesbian advocacy of legal monism seems distinctly 
aggressive, hostile, and unfriendly to queer interests. While it is 
possible that mainstream gays and lesbians could be friends with 
queers in the future, this would require a radical revision of 
contemporary gay and lesbian politics. Unfortunately, as the next 
section discusses, the gay and lesbian establishment‘s present 
political and legal imagination is only as visionary as looking in the 
mirror usually proves to be. It is no wonder then that gays and 
lesbians have not been Obama‘s favorite people. 
B. The Don‟ts and Dos of Queer/Religious Friendship: A Cautionary 
Note on Faux Amis 
In May 2009, two same-sex couples filed a Complaint in a San 
Francisco federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of 
California‘s Proposition 8. This case has come to be known as Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger.
161
 The legal team representing these two couples 
who wished to get married in the State of California but were unable 
to because of Proposition 8 included two well-known attorneys, 
Theodore Olson and David Boies.
162
 Olson is a well-known 
conservative attorney, having recently served as United States 
Solicitor General from 2001 to 2004, at the behest of former 
President George W. Bush.
163
 Prior to this appointment, Olson 
achieved national prominence in his role representing then-
presidential candidate George W. Bush before the Supreme Court in 
Bush v. Gore.
164
 His legal adversary in that case, but now co-counsel 
 
 161. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2010). For more information about 
the plaintiffs and this case, see American Foundation for Equal Rights, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, http://www.equalrightsfoundation.org/our-work/perry-v-schwarzenegger/ (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2010). 
 162. See American Foundation for Equal Rights, supra note 161. 
 163. See Gibson Dunn, Theodore B. Olson, http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/tolson 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010). 
 164. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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in the California Proposition 8 litigation, was David Boies. Boies, in 
addition to representing then-presidential candidate Albert Gore in 
Bush v. Gore, is otherwise well-known for his efforts on behalf of the 
Democratic Party.
165
 
In this concluding section, I want to caution against faux amis, or 
the ―false friends‖ that the Olson-Boies partnership represents vis-à-
vis the particular kind of queer/religious friendship that I propose in 
this Article. The decision by Olson and Boies to take on the 
representation of their gay and lesbian plaintiffs‘ legal challenge to 
Proposition 8 came as an immense surprise to many people. Given 
these two lawyers‘ famous face-off in the hotly contested Bush v. 
Gore, and because each is commonly perceived as a lead 
representative of ―the Right‖ and ―the Left,‖166 respectively, Olson 
and Boies were deemed unlikely collaborators on almost any issue, 
much less that of same-sex marriage. While this collaboration might 
thus appear to be the kind of non-intuitive ―left/right‖ friendship that 
I am proposing, as I argue in this concluding and cautionary section, 
the Olson-Boies partnership is a false cognate—or, as a French 
grammarian would say, a faux ami—to what I am proposing in this 
Article. Judith Butler describes ―law‘s uncanny capacity to produce 
only those rebellions that it can guarantee will—out of fidelity—
defeat themselves,‖167 and here I would like to forestall, if perhaps 
only temporarily, the defeat that my rebellious friendship poses to 
―the law‖ of existing American sexuality politics by highlighting how 
this rebellion would certainly suffer defeat if it was confused with the 
Olson-Boies friendship. Ultimately, I believe that the Olson-Boies 
friendship is less an ―unlikely union,‖168 but rather the sort of natural 
alliance which comes about between two persons/positions that see 
eye-to-eye vis-à-vis legal monism.  
 
 165. See Eve Conant, Gay Marriage: The Case from the Left, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 2010, 
http://newsweek.com/id/230316. 
 166. See, e.g., id. (stating ―[t]heir teamwork math is simple: Olson is the conservative and 
Boies is the liberal‖). 
 167. BUTLER, supra note 21, at 144. 
 168. See Mitch Potter, Same-Sex Legal Team an Unlikely Union, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 12, 
2010, available at http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/749461-same-sex-legal-team-an-
unlikely-union. 
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In what follows, I would like to make this point in a somewhat 
roundabout way. On that note, much is made of ―plaintiff choice‖ in 
high-profile, groundbreaking, impact litigation cases. As Mary 
Bonauto of Lambda Legal has explained: ―You want people who can 
withstand the rigors of a multiyear process . . . [the] kind of people 
you wouldn‘t mind sitting in a room and chatting with, no matter who 
you are. We are always concerned about people who are overeager to 
be plaintiffs, and people who are huge activists.‖169 Here, I would like 
to reverse the usual skeptical gaze cast by impact-litigation attorneys 
toward ―huge activist‖ plaintiffs, and ask instead: Who in the gay, 
lesbian, or queer communities got to choose Olson and Boies to argue 
on the behalf of non-heterosexuals‘ ―dignity‖ in front of a federal 
district court judge in San Francisco? The answer, as the following 
discussion suggests, is that Olson and Boies picked themselves, in the 
process becoming the ―huge activist‖ plaintiffs that Bonauto worries 
about.
170
  
And, indeed, there has been much to worry about in Olson and 
Boies‘s legal strategies. In their Complaint challenging Proposition 8, 
Olson and Boies asked, on behalf of their couple-clients, for a 
preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Proposition 8.
171
 In 
arguing for this provisional, pre-trial remedy, the Complaint asserted 
that plaintiffs were experiencing ―severe humiliation, emotional 
distress, pain, suffering, psychological harm, and stigma caused by 
the inability to marry the ones they love and have society accord their 
unions and their families the same respect and dignity enjoyed by 
opposite-sex unions and families.‖172 Moreover, the Complaint 
continued, lest anyone forget what this marital respect and dignity 
 
 169. Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal: Is It Too Soon to Petition the Supreme Court on 
Gay Marriage?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, available at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
reporting/2010/01/18/100118fa_fact_talbot. 
 170. Nan Hunter has remarked: ―I fear that their [Olson and Boies‘s] strategy is: Ted Olson 
will speak, Anthony Kennedy will listen, and the earth will move. I hope I‘m wrong about 
this—they‘re excellent lawyers—but I fear, frankly, that there‘s more ego than analysis in 
[this].‖ Id.  
 171. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief at 10, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
No. 09-CV-02292 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009). 
 172. Id. 
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entails, one should not, because it is clear that marriage ―enjoys a 
long history and uniform recognition.‖173 
Ignoring for the moment the public theatrics orchestrated by this 
litigation, as well as the legalistic requirements that any successful 
request for a preliminary injunction must satisfy and the choices in 
language that those requirements invite,
174
 and taking the Hydra-
headed claim of ―severe humiliation, emotional distress, pain, 
suffering, psychological harm, and stigma‖ at face value,175 one has 
to wonder who exactly feels this way about being denied merely the 
status of ―marriage‖ as opposed to its material and legal benefits (as 
California‘s ―separate but equal‖ domestic partnership system 
provides)? Certainly, it seems unlikely that the plaintiffs 
themselves—all of them presently unmarried, and only one of them 
previously legally married—can attest to this.176 
If there are experiential problems with ascribing this intense—
indeed, unbearable—suffering to the plaintiffs themselves in this 
case, there are far fewer problems with ascribing such pain to the 
lawyers who actually drafted this Complaint. And, in this respect, and 
given the intense scrutiny that the institution of marriage is currently 
under in part due to this federal case, one cannot help but notice that 
Olson and Boies both have repeatedly enjoyed the benefits of this 
institution. Moreover, not only have Olson and Boies both enjoyed 
the legal privilege of entering into marriage once, but so have they 
 
 173. Id. at 8. 
 174. I am referring here to the requirement that the party moving for a preliminary 
injunction show some chance of ―irreparable injury‖ for the injunction to be issued. Sampson v. 
Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (―The Court has stated that ‗the basis of injunctive relief in the 
federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies. . . .‘‖ 
(quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–07 (1959)). 
 175. See supra note 171. Presumably one should take the claim at face value, given the 
possibility of Civil Procedure Rule 11 sanctions in this and any other federal cases for the act of 
―presenting to [a] court any pleading, written motion, or other paper‖ containing ―factual 
contentions [without] evidentiary support.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
 176. Neither of the two male plaintiffs in this case seem to have been married before. See 
Complaint, supra note 171, at 2–7. However, the female plaintiffs got married to each other in 
2004 in San Francisco, only to see their marriage later invalidated by the California Supreme 
Court when the Court ruled that San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom was acting without legal 
authority in issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples during that time. Id. Prior to this, one 
of these women was married to a man. See Richard C. Paddock, 2 Couples Make Case for Gay 
Rights in Big Trial, AOL NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.aolnews.com/article/2-couples-make 
-case-for-gay-rights-in-landmark-trial/19312894. 
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enjoyed the legal privilege of engaging in re-marriage, re-re-marriage 
and, in the case of Olson, re-re-re-marriage. Olson is presently 
married to his fourth wife, after divorcing two previous ones and 
suffering the loss of another in the 9/11 attack on Washington, 
D.C.
177
 Boies is presently married to his third wife, after divorcing 
two previous ones.
178
 
Given all this, I believe that one can only truly begin to 
understand and appreciate the particularly strong—indeed, 
unbearable—injury resulting from lack of access to majoritarian 
marriage that Olson and Boies‘s litigation strategy articulates by 
understanding the personal biographies of these two lawyers 
themselves. Their extensive familiarity with the institution of 
marriage clearly suggests why they decided to become such ―huge 
activist‖ plaintiffs in this case. It is less clear whether their particular 
goal in this litigation is some sort of generalized goal of proselytizing 
majoritarian marriage, or whether their goal is a more defensive one 
of preserving the future viability and availability of marriage (for 
themselves) by forestalling impending moves to abolish the 
institution altogether.
179
 However, whatever the case may be, I 
believe that it is fair to conclude that what we ultimately have here is 
most definitely not a meaningful ―left/right‖ coalition but, rather, a 
joint effort by two men, both of whom apparently love majoritarian 
marriage, to preserve the viability and future availability of this 
majoritarian institution for themselves and/or others. 
 
 177. See Amy Argetsinger & Roxanne Roberts, Napa Nuptials for Olson and His Lady, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2006/10/22/AR2006102200052.html. 
 178. See Anna Schneider-Mayerson, The Boies Family, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 
8 (describing how Boies met and when he separated from his previous two wives); see also 
Mitch Frank & Daniel Okrent, Get Me Boies!, TIME, Dec. 25, 2000, available at http://www. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,998841-1,00.html. 
 179. Both the California Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
contemplated the possible remedy of abolishing civil marriage for everyone, instead of opening 
up civil marriage to same-sex couples, in addition to mixed-sex couples. See In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 425–26 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
969 (Mass. 2003) (contemplating yet rejecting the potential remedy of marriage abolishment). 
Although, both courts chose the latter remedy, one can envision future state high courts more 
seriously contemplating the former remedy, especially after witnessing all of the ruckus that has 
resulted in other states where same-sex ―marriage‖ has been allowed. 
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As dubious as the motivation behind Olson and Boies‘s particular 
partnership is, it is also difficult to view positively the broader impact 
of their work. Certainly, it is nearly impossible to describe their work 
as anything like ―building a coalition‖ (much less a friendly and 
welcoming one). While both lawyers have spoken publicly about 
their larger goal of gay and lesbian equality that they hope this case 
will facilitate—a goal larger than the specific aim of obtaining 
marriage licenses for the four plaintiffs the two lawyers specifically 
represent
180—Olson and Boies have refrained from any serious effort 
to engage the talents of those who have experience working toward 
this larger goal. In this respect, in addition to publicly exchanging 
epistolary barbs with organizations and persons who have this 
experience,
181
 Olson and Boies legally opposed an effort by the 
American Civil Liberties Union (―ACLU‖), Lambda Legal, and the 
National Center for Lesbian Rights (―NCLR‖) to formally intervene 
in the federal district court case, despite these organizations‘ 
extensive litigation experience vis-à-vis the issues raised by the 
 
 180. Olson has described this case as a ―teaching opportunity, so people will listen to us 
talk about the importance of treating people with dignity and respect and equality and affection 
and love and to stop discriminating against people on the basis of sexual orientation.‖ Talbot, 
supra note 169. Boies has remarked:  
Proposition 8 clearly and fundamentally violates the freedoms guaranteed to all of us 
by the Constitution . . . Every American has a right to full equality under the law. 
Same sex couples are entitled to the same marriage rights as straight couples. Any 
alternative is separate and unequal and relegates gays and lesbians to a second class 
status. 
Press Release, American Foundation for Equal Rights, Prop. 8 Challenged in Federal Court; 
Ted Olson & David Boies to Argue Case (May 27, 2009), available at http://www.equalrights 
foundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/2009.05.27_AFER_Case_Announce.pdf. 
 181. See generally Letter from Chad H. Griffin, Board President, American Foundation for 
Equal Rights, to Kate Kendell et al., Executive Dir., Nat‘l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights (July 8, 
2009), available at http://www.towleroad.com/2009/07/pushback-from-olsonboies-as-lgbt-
groups-file-to-intervene.html. In this letter, Griffin writes: 
 [G]iven [the American Foundation for Equal Rights‘s] willingness to collaborate 
with you, and your efforts to undercut this case, we were surprised and disappointed 
when we became aware of your desire to intervene. You have unrelentingly and 
unequivocally acted to undermine this case even before it was filed. In light of this, it 
is inconceivable that you would zealously and effectively litigate this case if you were 
successful in intervening. Therefore, we will vigorously oppose any motion to 
intervene. 
Id. 
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case.
182
 Olson has stated that these organizations‘ assistance would 
have prevented a ―unified, controlled, consistent, on-message 
approach.‖183 In this respect, when Chad Griffin, one of the key 
players in organizing and finding financing for the Olson-Boies 
litigation,
184
 expressed that he wanted ―the [kind of] lawyers [for this 
case that] Microsoft [would] want, not the lawyers who are going to 
do it pro bono,
185
 he seems to have gotten what he wanted.‖  
The litigation effort by Olson and Boies, then, does not represent a 
new coalition of interests—much less a new political friendship—of 
any significance. Olson and Boies are best described as two married 
men working to preserve a majoritarian institution that they enjoy and 
have benefited from and presumably want to enjoy and benefit from 
in the future, rather than two men who have crossed ideological and 
political fault-lines to offer a new alignment, a new imagination, or 
new possibilities.  
I believe that queers can do much better than Olson and Boies, or 
gay and lesbian same-sex marriage advocates themselves. Whereas 
Olson and Boies do not want to seriously engage even with their gay 
and lesbian friends—keeping them at arm‘s length as ambivalent 
amici rather than inviting them in as co-plaintiffs
186—and gay and 
lesbian same-sex marriage advocates are committed to their own 
form of monastic monism, the collaborative approach I suggest in 
 
 182. See id. As James Esseks, co-director of the ACLU‘s ―Lesbian Gay Bisexual 
Transgender Project‖ described this litigation experience and the motivation behind these 
organizations‘ application to intervene: ―The questions posed by the court are exactly the 
questions our organizations have been addressing for years in state and federal courts all across 
the country.‖ Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, LGBT Community Groups Seek 
to Intervene in Federal Challenge to Proposition 8 (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.aclu. 
org/lgbt-rights/lgbt-community-groups-seek-intervene-federal-challenge-proposition-8. 
 183. Talbot, supra note 169. 
 184. Id. (describing Griffin‘s role in organizing and helping find financing for the Olson-
Boies litigation). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Letter from Chad H. Griffin, supra note 181. Writing to these organizations, 
Griffin stated: 
 [r]egrettably, you embarked on a public and private campaign to undermine our 
efforts to vindicate the federal constitutional rights of California‘s gay and lesbian 
residents. We nevertheless remain willing to work closely with you at all stages of this 
case and welcome your continued participation in the district court proceedings as an 
amicus curiae. But we cannot and will not support your motion to intervene. 
Id. 
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this Article is one that has queers re-interrogating their ―others,‖ 
reaching out to their ostensible enemies, and making new religious 
friends. It is an approach for—as the epigraph that opens this Article 
suggests—the Obama era. 
How to even begin with this approach is difficult to imagine, 
however. In closing this Part, I would like to sketch—very briefly—
an opening for queer/religious friendship that Olson and Boies‘s 
otherwise jurispathic litigation efforts have generated. In doing so, I 
will make use of the arguments put forth by another ―frenemy‖ of 
Olson and Boies, namely the City of San Francisco, which also 
sought to intervene into this federal case on the plaintiffs‘ side.187 
Olson and Boies opposed San Francisco‘s intervention application, 
though less strenuously than with respect to the attempted 
ACLU/Lambda Legal/NCLR intervention.
188
 However, Olson and 
Boies‘s effort to block out San Francisco and monopolize this 
litigation, as well as the meaning of ―marriage,‖ ―dignity,‖ and other 
key terms of the terrain over which the litigation is being fought, was 
unsuccessful and the federal district court judge in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger permitted the City‘s intervention.189 
Given the potential conclusions that the City of San Francisco‘s 
arguments in support of its intervention lead toward, one can perhaps 
understand why Olson and Boies were opposed to the City‘s direct 
involvement in the case. Indeed, while the City of San Francisco 
petitioned to intervene in favor of same-sex ―marriage‖ rights,190 
some of the arguments that the City deployed in favor of its 
intervention just as readily lend themselves to queer/religious legal 
 
 187. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene as Party Plaintiff; Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 
2009). 
 188. See Plaintiffs‘ Opposition to Proposed Intervenors‘ Motions to Intervene at 16, Perry 
v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (―Plaintiffs oppose any further 
intervention in their case. However, if the Court is inclined to permit any intervention, Plaintiffs 
respectfully request that the Court permit only the City to intervene and strictly limit its 
participation to prevent delay and ensure a fair and efficient proceeding for Plaintiffs.‖). 
 189. Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 950 n.l (9th Cir. 2009). 
 190. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene as Party Plaintiff; Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 
2009). 
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pluralism goals. The City of San Francisco‘s relevant legal arguments 
in this respect were as follows: 
 San Francisco bears the financial burden of providing 
health care, welfare benefits, and other social services to adults 
and children who become dependent on public resources when 
a relationship breaks down. By denying same-sex couples the 
right to marry, Prop. 8 makes it less likely that such couples 
will formalize their relationships in a way that imposes 
obligations of support upon which adults and children may 
rely. Studies show that same-sex couples are significantly less 
likely to enter into domestic partnerships and civil unions, 
which lack the full social and governmental sanction and status 
of marriage, than they are to enter into marriage. 
Notwithstanding California's domestic partnership law, its 
denial of marriage to same-sex couples increases the likelihood 
that San Francisco‘s citizens will depend on local [public] 
health and welfare programs.
191
 
One might wonder what in this pro-intervention legal argument 
gestures toward queer friendship with radical religiosity or legal 
pluralism. One can begin to see this, I believe, by looking back 
almost forty years to one of the most famous Supreme Court cases 
pertaining to religious exceptionalism, that of Wisconsin v. Yoder.
192
 
This well-known case concerned the constitutionality of the State 
of Wisconsin‘s criminal prosecution of three Amish parents for 
refusing to send their children, aged fourteen and fifteen, to school.
193
 
At the time, Wisconsin statutory law required children to be sent to 
public or private school until the age of sixteen.
194
 When the parents 
refused to comply with this law, they were tried, convicted, and each 
fined five dollars.
195
 In response, they brought a constitutional 
challenge to Wisconsin‘s compulsory school attendance law, alleging 
that it violated their First Amendment rights to practice their 
 
 191. Complaint in Intervention for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief at 6, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, No. 09-CV-2292 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2009). 
 192. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 193. Id. at 207. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 208. 
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particular Amish ―religion.‖196 In response, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that ―the First [] Amendment[] prevent[s] the State from 
compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high 
school to age 16.‖197 
For my purposes here, more important than the Court‘s ultimate 
holding in this case is the Court‘s characterization of the separateness 
and material independence of the religious communities implicated in 
this case. Wrote the Court:  
The State attacks respondents‘ position as one fostering 
‗ignorance‘ from which the child must be protected by the 
State. No one can question the State‘s duty to protect children 
from ignorance but this argument does not square with the 
facts disclosed in the record. Whatever their idiosyncrasies as 
seen by the majority, this record strongly shows that the Amish 
community has been a highly successful social unit within our 
society, even if apart from the conventional ‗mainstream.‘ Its 
members are productive and very law-abiding members of 
society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modern 
forms. The Congress itself recognized their self-sufficiency by 
authorizing exemption of such groups as the Amish from the 
obligation to pay social security taxes.  
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]here [is not] any showing that upon leaving the 
Amish community Amish children, with their practical 
agricultural training and habits of industry and self-reliance, 
would become burdens on society because of educational 
short-comings.  
 . . . . 
 . . . Indeed, the Amish communities singularly parallel and 
reflect many of the virtues of [Thomas] Jefferson‘s ideal of the 
‗sturdy yeoman‘ who would form the basis of what he 
 
 196. For the facts of this case, see id. at 207–09. Specifically, two of the parents belonged 
to the ―Old Order Amish religion‖ and one belonged to the ―Conservative Amish Mennonite 
Church.‖ Id. at 207. 
 197. Id. at 234. 
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considered as the ideal of a democratic society. Even their 
idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the diversity we profess 
to admire and encourage.
198
 
The Court‘s positive characterization of the plaintiffs as belonging 
to communities that do not burden the material resources of the state 
parallels and anticipates the City of San Francisco‘s positive 
characterization of marriage as an institution that allows one to 
extricate one‘s self from dependency on the state‘s welfare programs. 
In other words, in the same way that the Supreme Court in Yoder 
seemed to say that the facilitation of non-state religious communal 
life is a good thing because members of such communities do not 
utilize social welfare programs, the City of San Francisco in its 
intervention petition in Perry v. Schwarzenegger seems to be saying 
that marital communities/couples are good because members of such 
communities/couples do not utilize social welfare programs. 
The City of San Francisco‘s unconscious alignment with historical 
religious separatist movements is an intriguing—and potentially quite 
queer-friendly
199—development. Certainly, it is the case that the City 
of San Francisco is using modalities of argument historically 
associated with legal separatism and legal pluralism in favor of the 
kind of legal monism that Olson and Boies and other same-sex 
marriage advocates are pursuing to queers‘ detriment. However, that 
being said, it is arguably the case that the legal result that is actually 
the most consistent with the City of San Francisco‘s legal arguments 
is not state-premised ―marriage‖ for everyone, regardless of its fit or 
appropriateness or desirability, but rather a type of legal regime that 
enables all sorts of communities (including all sorts of couples) to 
effectively structure their intimate and other lives in an empowered 
 
 198. Id. at 222, 224–26. 
 199. The City of San Francisco‘s legal arguments are queer-friendly in ways different from 
their friendliness towards legal pluralism as well. For example, in these arguments‘ reliance on 
social scientific inquiry generally, and economic analyses specifically, they are arguably less 
imperial and less normalizing than those deployed by other contemporary gay and lesbian 
same-sex marriage advocates. Indeed, the City‘s economic analyses as to the (detrimental) 
economic impact of not recognizing same-sex marriage are entirely subject to revision in the 
future, especially as more eyes begin to examine the enormous dollar amount of social subsidies 
that majoritarian ―special‖ interests have been able to legislatively embed in majoritarian 
marriage over time. 
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way, i.e., one that does not require them to submit to the state in order 
to sustain themselves economically, socially, or legally. Arguably, 
this would require that the state not quash these communities/couples, 
but also not make it difficult for each community/couple to flourish 
in its own way, for its own reasons, and on its own terms.  
This type of ―San Francisco legal regime‖ might be akin to a 
private ordering regime, though there are other possibilities as well. 
What is fairly clear, however, is that such a legal regime would be 
pluralistic—not monistic—and would thereby have space for queers, 
the Amish, and other radically religious people too. This is a 
queer/religious legal regime for the Obama era, and beyond.  
CONCLUSION 
In the contemporary American political lexicon, ―fundamentally‖ 
religious people who do not behave—whether orthodox, evangelical, 
Mormon, Mennonite, Taliban, or otherwise—are judged just as 
dangerous as sexually deviant people and their uncooperative desires. 
In other words, deviant religiosity and deviant sexuality are each 
―queer‖ in their own way. Given this basic (if abstract) similarity, it 
would seem that both deviations might have much to gain by working 
with each other to moderate the pernicious effects of a power-jealous 
and norm-domineering state. 
Accordingly, in this Article, I have argued the worth of queers 
exploring a future political friendship with the radically religious. I 
have also explored with some detail one agenda item—namely, the 
adoption of a more pluralistic administration of family law—with 
which to initiate this exploration. Of course, who exactly would want 
to be friends with whom remains to be seen, and it is not the 
suggestion of this Article that all queers and all radically religious 
people will be best friends forever. Both queer and religious interests 
are fissiparous and always evolving, and one can never assume 
alignment either within or between these groupings. That being said, 
the assumption has been that queer folk and non-mainstream 
religious folk (e.g., Mormons, the overly-orthodox, etc.) are already 
and will always be enemies. In this Article, I suggest that this 
assumption is facile, especially in the current political environment. 
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In some respects, clearly, my argument here is a revolutionary 
one, especially to the extent that the queer/religious friendship that it 
suggests can only work to deepen an existing tension between 
contemporary queer and gay and lesbian activisms. In other respects, 
however, the argument is staid and conciliatory—though certainly 
not unprincipled or un-theorized—especially to the extent that it 
suggests that the pluralistic family law and relationship-recognition 
regimes that have recently emerged in California and other states, and 
which are commonplace in countries all over the world, are 
phenomena that hold real promise for the realization of regularly-
recited liberal values, including ―dignity.‖  
However one characterizes it, my hope is that the argument I 
make in this Article will cause some to consider real alternatives to 
the corrosive and unfriendly politics surrounding same-sex marriage 
presently. Or so one can—following Obama—only hope. 
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